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,vy thesis who accepted resident irurati T> and beca&e
the Oasis oi the ^National searit* Act ; 1 .7, which created,
inter alia , the .ationai ..ecurity Council um4 nteiiigence
Agancy, and ,,*-.ve sta / recognition to ",h« Join' 'dtaff
11
within a nal iiitary isfaeer.t."*'
In analyzing this "cattle of the j-oto»e , . . ostow
states, "the battle over unification was c „ed »itn relatively
little tr.cunht I military problems
in the post-1945 psriod--except for : superficial debuts
on waning and limitation of strategic air power."* In the
li fc*nt cf subssqusnt etunt:. , this sseas too harsh a criticism.
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an instantaneous shift -.c IM
oi' the de facto oppositional relationship that had gradually
developed ^inee the #ar, coupled sitn the charting], of new courses
w t . .Is of a bipolar world.
..:.> mt .ifxcant of the dGvalopcenta 7 was
the unveiling of the strategy of containment aa the rxdai«iatration»a
basic blueprint for the control M m It receive
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; trine. It4l»t» occasion for this policy enu on
the linn, itoa assumption of Slit burd&n of aid, to uroeoe
and orly borne by .-ritainj however, t\.- e t!
itic ietl M cle f global
•igftlfi* ahco. tt:, est be the policy fees' s«s
to support :. ties vl Iptei subjugation
by ars&ed titles W ettl UP^tt" ' MMl Ml . jctr-




Confusion m .1 ,?47
I ecmsi
I
int of confusion . mm seaoes
thw interralat. it erf n*t acnta.. • >llcy una the
/ctrin«. A ai,,nii'icant point, oft: „.„.. :, ths.it
work , LB 111 anal vie , • *o be
interpreted lit . nriMgt s I WMM»t* as
requiring ftfl . ,-.atlc military . nsa to en .uniut
n; rattier, ^e
. locnl oppoaltiun to I to it ic
pet I >t sftlj 1141 lie he>v* little to do with the ration
of I trine,'" but, ehen shoes a c- the sj
1 .... . .. .,i.«..i.., ,——..,__,. 1 i.l . m- .. .. .... .ii . .. .. .«—«. 1.11- . 1. . ...— 1 I m l -... ...» ,-—.....,- ..
-
.' ifas deiivure. reei4e»1 ore
m of the *rch is , I .
in Aut* •^artpsnt Bu lie tip . Marsh ftl, 194? i PP. 534-57.
or a aainutely it.- tailed but m of
the devel*
.
. of t jctfinc , see . lonee,











oorapleted a raft, "to eay t I found objections to it it to at
it isildly. ft objected otrun^ly both to khe to;.
ana . specific action propose .
us &••! of alter I***** violent criticlasa of what
he i::torpr«ted H IN Kenfift&'e containment u/lioy, which w^re bat
on the belief that it SOa14 cverooauttit the ,.-ut- I , would
acto M B&ftl an.
.lie both ftf Ittftftt related ideas, containment --..ad the
,
had «ml poiat the Ion;- 10-
UtW» oppositio ft*** 'onnan's concept lifftftftsd Ma« tt( ty
a sifts *••£* of *eana ox opposition, a complete a toe*. -.-.• ,
.1 }*ar pift/sft I I t role, slMMNMM liftffti
Mftft'S prone I on record, the, new .ic^,
without delineation of '--.:.# - • •*#*
on to at* i.«^eaiate application in 0rs*ftf ana fftffttftjr. Hf loter-
cation, therefore, . iff I t#MM emerges as IAS chaapj.on pi
.ted s*ar strategy in 1947.
. ill oi' mitlgli however, I luttsmt
iftc i . eacriptivu
.ru&an'a aid to Ursese and furicsy becasae t I eae example, the
public* j b! a : , of coat.- t in aotion. ..conotic . | to
be given prifaac/, political ere to be lees emphasised, and




eelTS oi Llpp lislss are coliucl.
:-ar: .. tudy in .. ../. foroi^n^o lic.y (Ms* foffki Harper ft]
iffoiimrsa 1947).
69
oitzei, apian, au ..dens, p. 112.
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of this nsw strategy went b«yon •»*%•*« ftediti H*a soon
seen in thus sfarshall -rlin airlift. I it Mc
• ric&n po-u
-
'.xin-; •&§•! I the u^-er MuUL, ia,
when presented wit fait accp^-gili of th« Pyftgat couf; d 'etat.
fot II Mtyl&Ms of eootal as the nation's ffftukd
71
strategy was not tie Unit lea. Its
negative, defensive connotations clashed violently wit ..rica'e
...;Jitio. rthritfht, sold, issa»;e, as a nation a tan tin re
pow«r politics and oonductir:. fftVttigfl reVatlffei Mtftdiag to
universal tsor&l and Icr i*4 .... 1. tic-nil M»,
churac t*9fM4 by a a athy war, when
.illy forced It Ml l wouli do so with all her ot^r
woui ;i seise the initiative in Ul« « WB&B i ty
,
y the offensive to the tiMMy until hiss uneonditio;;
I
aurrenaer. i UMMUMMI • tics,
lay the pow^r p#li%t*t £M# to the hilt, be quick lc riMl t
yet not soek to nl'lf II ill aggression, fettt . .ierva
sutu^
^
uo in the | lanes, y- met oivee
with cosxiste?5ce, a on ifee liberation of enslaved
peoples. lis Keep a fir~ Clausewitsian political rein ofl
military action, I :<a our crusading seal. - W>%*ir«l --uts
of this l -Hey ar# atfttf*f In *mjr trn&i tion»l p*tdi*f4
that the containment c ', and the strategy »f tift&ted m required
r tns tvnlntl
. r,tr lion's China polle/i ,. ,, >
...U r . is with u'bi.nsM i .'.. the
'"














to execute it, nave n eeoeived villi f.roi'ou- taste, a
tht- I tea* raaalfcai in fru.;trati an ai , . a t
oction. ucb ao, »u lobart . I • --4 , - tfct tor®
I
. in&ent If avail* tala« where
our policy is druS8#d in the elegant I I tive Maturity ,'
veyir.. asion t&at our actions ar-. en
for i bl law, a;. .oe&ii: ality
.t *hey a' aatlanal interest, lit i'ror
the ©motional I kaaaa of eaataiaaaat, its* aatari&l demands
struc*; aa£4 at fclM - socket book, for a co. vIuk and ali-
enee;?, paa a in,' . itagy designed to ??e«t any and over cy
on |M Mai ia ama* tiraas »ore expensive taaa a eiepler
on«, such as a tr .italic retaliation.
¥«t the question has not been one of whether «re
to contair , but rather ho* to iapl assent it. Kara a vacuus
davalc,. feat »a» not filled by Baaa :*cheaon*s attempts to explain
th; •; trine to . »aal co£?>itteea, in which h«
carefully avoided any c a action
ht take. In short, at this point Ataarioa &a£ *v policy, I
not a strategy—a national goal, but not a well-davelc. Ian
Tor the easploy:ae>. . IfticJ goal, od
sees it, ''there is a# evidence that the principal polio,- ikera
were aaatcioi a farsi&hted strategic j I this
tijse, even though event foro- o execute Ilia fif
aajor fjea&ure ;, naaat| and it It certain that •£ 'iOt
72 i.kid.. P. 14
73
Jon , . 1$ - ? ', ..or an of
excerpts of this tai

Ml
graapftd the ox limited »*jr va <-«&/ o< contui;.
would ontail." 74
ttMM a c,;.iU3im< r#i#f€4« one *jLt aepirafco
~atinct viewpoints , lb« c. iiotJisa to df
all . . li ae«a | mt
I the window I I n.«ea.
Hern tho felt! k* doier,
or if j la to I > . -ion of two
••• 10 strict, teatiati ot o«ili:< I i Ri-
i* billion , and t*e rial
fCNfftitatftt to -ir po—y » i«4f kbit trend In ars
1947-l. !<r;\J. fhoro . itl not ft l*ft to ueveloi, the
f#ff*M require r« _.....: .; i'orc
BMPgl MMPi Quri: loo. §• re »tt to pr«T«Al
uta fp»yfli of » ic
m foe nt. la fftetj tat reeoneallati
of cout?*i euty«»6oitfrot«loft*l view in an/ Manner
I ficult.
aide - tri&u#l« oan Hi I M
*effiai«l policy" • !>*%* .-•• . Ag !.<ar« tr*ere was no
t oontftisjMUkt r .,.11.... , k -ill * .of
doubt as w we proposed to oontiun.
thifi 100S to i:uV3 iMff) | Ct^t-'-r
to th<s effect - . .:





, 'K » i ; * *5W.
7*>
> , . . ?7?.
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one, that tin hcmb was r^;&rded as provi iti? very e .?:©,
the aasifv; :*obise,. - ft* %w*, kaftt the Idea of
liait (till not i . • reek Civtl ar
te event, aat M the tsodel for future ware.
The teriin airlift, a cizi- of a non-violer;*, I«4





uieurea and threats to cose. 11 taa
,
having a..: I , «e no« red all its iaplications,
inci the central one of Halted war, and re#reus«d to the
total war fixation.
finally, «a regards the third aspect—our action aa orisee
developed—the |||iim crated alao<»t entix= , Vu.;
r
basia, since we hud not a iated nor pla: ^r the type of
:uatlons we had to face. tfeai ie stoat sur; r is that our
-ovisei r were so successful. Greece waa sawed alaoat
lj bjr toarlaail pa j, with Military assistance directed
7?
by the Van Fleet aiaaior. .oainatii. a Berlin airlift
ko4 a '-ajor cold vap victory. Yet tnese succeasoa .
little effect . t v.e three aides of the triar loser
fcoap*
As for silit*ry thought, • ,-ublis . f i*o
articioii afeiofc, since taop had offioiul eanction, fava the , ublic
its first pool insight into .-ar act ant thiufcln .
76
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e. ..toaic scientists , 11. , s« •• , I . . I









:• csrvice r ac weapons aa revolutionising ita
tautica, - tly prool&iswrd feaa Vital i escort.'ince of tnalr
. >tur»* striit^^jf, vet, ti .-.are R1
ii #t i aaa - Ijr a Muraiac mi of
a of atosii
I record - ..tisaonjr of ailitary witness
EMirv^'i to | i«e ft few coason
. rsta la a* otherwise iivaraa picture. Pit I , .-- tegy »»*
defensive, confining BS I reaction, f*taa* kfeaa
.ti&tion, :,«co«i, t tinat .. I to
«rould bo M it direct military onslaught, fhia lad to
UN consensus, the "total eax or total peace" fixation, which
n't accomodate any solutions to the typo of threat ssoat lively
to be launched by a ?.renlin curoii; .id a ^MM belli .
.-abilities to the likalj challenge,
hq tenaeJ I ; Bit our | 1< of the likely ahalftftfii Ii
M
enormity ef the view weapons." Ihaaa cOisrson balicza, the
.-i.vtrgor.ee of opinion «as great.








.• brief otupoaologleal look at Lata of our
litarj pallo, -: raa to
ill., i Lraotlo U » la Jaaaajry »£ 1948 the
Freeident*a dr Pcltej , - . I . fialetter,
•t. >lle sa v^a la al
79 leaing^r, ^.ucl^r .e-^ona .an i ^'or-:; i;;n ;, ol ic v , • . .
~r Pali oaaiealon, ^XAIiiA Ail„?v *„'-',.- AC .
iifcJLIL-::: ont




aviation polity* by ita precept, the report sataall jc" into the
deeper witters of national neurit; , I s a la effect, the ai*
i-orce view of nation iteg/. Its so . . , the
,-tw.ry structure, tfeaaafofa« uit© predictable*
. . .
this iilitai ^liahaent auat be built around
Ml air ari , J i round
rat Mt be s&int;/. i . I xt ib the a*Y ; ore©
. ion on which wo aaat ssainly rely.
<r military security oust be baaed on air power. s *
qually predictable were its views that li it«d or localised ware
were "not liKely" a; repare tor u direct air aa.-.ault
§2
on the Bait* tea mainland. ^ry 1 , ly"}} wai; kafgatf a«
- v
, , the day on which a ..oviot atoaic att count .
would be pot , i I a massive air pow«r buildup waa c lor
to count .a threat. In till lea. for "a new strategic
concept" with a cos-e of air pow*r, able to "retaliate with the
utmost violence," ' can be seen the aeedu of the Hmassive I . ation"
doo trine of th< ... *^n balance, the cor tributions of
litis paper in pointing to the taakaaat of our air lft( at a tiaa
t was alsout our sol*? defunae, and in indicating alaarly
His . - tioaa -'i5t^, ,, aai I by the
tsrro . concluylonc drawn ra# ature of wu.r in the
likely effect tolaav parity,
ttiag heavily %t f invincibility t
osuiipotence surrounding I oab was «inatc ill's
01,Ibid.





6 ?Xbid .. p. . X0t 13«
04
oe ittirii, , oh /.
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statement, carrying 'Hhij final! a papal bull," ' thats "'-othinff
stands between nurope today and ate aubjufcation '. iat
Q6
tyrant. the atonic bomb in aaerlcan pGaaeauion."
'.e really critical i<=v> teas to wh<ch the ;»ray
dropped in tall porioa is be»t illustrated by ifred
nut! :?r*a atatttjs ••it© House briefly, tfeftl 'e-ploynent
of anything MV1 !, . «.n a AiViftlM i;-. nny area would BAA x-tial
87
Befellia a necessity."* in thie at&oaphare, and a&uinat tho
I—ttirtf of the fall of Jaeohoelovakia and the lWIIIll . liona
erlin which were to lead in June to the blockade, want h«ld
th<» Key .eat conference of the Joint - xefe of taff on "roles
and aiieaions" of the services, fhilf no otartiin^ aftifta in cold
war atr.Hte.jy ware rsade at ttwo i£, several trouLleaotse iaauas
were a or, tied, and, in the; worda of alter illiii, iti
. . .
marked ginning of the effort to rebuild
the fcrvt f Hi* ffai I .




'. it M a a hole into
- tflUTi, i
gtua l. Llitary pro Diet
onfrontic country
.
Yet the ftttcapt i\ll somewhat abort ol ark,


















'' 7, for the text of I . ay







. 59 . [.Italioa nine.)
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v&tfueneaa to allow e**ch at rvico considerable latitude* in inter-
pretation, and Nu • an unwritten I BAffttn
bai&nced" forces . rhus in ittfttpNi be categorized »ore
accurately ft, tot of .-rr-uiutiori of ft ft**
doctrine, rather than a first step into a new ** Conaldering
the unae I - ~:>a in ffei** the nee:. Hi
held, thia outco~;Q t wisdo: .
a hard budgetary . renaure co . . ri in 1 ftftd »aa I
large R«asur© responsible for repre&e o esseroenct? bed
91
war forces and strategy* 114 -serge in 1948 . , was a
firner ****#ftlti*Q oi 4**rii . r**»f . nent concern with the
dei . urope, as a result of the loss oi 6s**h*sl**ftJcft*>«
-iin blockade, a.ni tbt eit'ects of the Hruoaela ract.
jttlf two ft**** OJL eWffi had gone to ; ngland and one to :ex'lin,
firmly establishing ato«ic mfttl in our -Jiolosatic and «ailita.r^
J2
strategy and presaging our later ooasiitaents to the :\orth
. intic fr**iy tts h *a.* in embryonic forsa by the
end oi ' . , . if the l lM8 success in .surope was the loss
of China to the «Q**ftlltllift, ft*ft seen as inevitable, which had '
effect 4 slarising American interest and efforts to an even
vter- export t than before ** ft** western end of the \uraeian
:
-»
t ] i no a.ivance, s >ssibly a &t...
buc.<t«ard to . Gvelc> - United w . Louia
03 tow,




Juhnaon replaced Jaaea Torres tal tf«AM« ana in
one of his fir^t acta, decread that the co. .tion of military
political until, now to . -lace at several levels between
the Defense and - , ftOt oeooo* * > nat hi! ;ot
appreciate ator, so vital to effective lisited
war, is understandable consider • tflttf preoccupation with
•••
ilf«*wtlO power.
treat/ waa I I in tprl . , : t although it waa
a oilitary alliance, there wae little available military *ow«r to
its benefits 00 I itialiy to - . . lOriljF politiool
oo
and psycho logical, ' with o&lj enough oilitar>- ground stren
to act aa a "trip wire" or "plate flAOt window" to I cot;
reealon an3 tend i,ates atostic tfl it rog to
»cow. ?hOOO bossbers were It 00 rincipal oilltojry contribution
of
to the alliance, indicating the close tie betwetu " our
strategic retaliation posture. If ,rn of a bsii«:
our air-atossic power wjta not the ideal tool for co. , .
creation iheles* ti we any visible effect r own
all
-©£/• Hto birtf; i :, v.owever, M a
'.ation
I -wide collective security network which ha a exercised
such a ssajor influence liov.
'^OegOOd, i,,i::.lti » ; ,.ar
, p. 1" I .







• ur "dieetigajge&cnt" i r» the i; &r Heat con
,
,-.. evMttM
I forooa fro; _o Ml li . , &4gMB%,
tfttM in Um y«<r, bv the Joint .luiwffi c * »e *
dei i08«. 3 - h car, pes be saea bhe m'<t;tslievably
low iev4il Bl offactive conv .ill forces* hal cropped,




- fcaff mmi ad
to be ring « ssilitary, ratfeef thnn a political, lial«a.
i year w&'. r «.d©a«,
however, ti totgm -, Mill head of the Folio/ Flai
, ..oresaw tho neud for a limited
togy, and for sxpau I .lYttntional ;orce3 to back it Uj .
warned the Joi.t • iefs that while tft* c.itegy waa
•sent, :.;ur sili r« was •©ar.itti M sore
to the »itfaer~or choice of all-out atomic ret
r at least two »ilt t mechanized divisions
for M« la "brusn-fire** wars, pointing out that all our preau
atrate&y Bon f«r alliee waa the uncomfortable proepect of
lib '.: follow:
-, Lj that. '
I th-it tfclc ty^e I bo da^irabla,
declare^ by feat ftrtMMl -.on
e.
X bl i_. , p. 236. ra to "four
i o.» 1 t . ' . -'- i3»
99






. . a, 229. ,^«s the expls: m
priority >' : .- 1 .
.
- lxtiea for .c)v
vat to taj ..r war, coupled ot




tatevar eh&nee this limits WW proposal t have na.
aanar tisiea, fll the ientagoa
ism-out AftlM - . -
c on trover «;/ . >;t * . I w»a tha constant byuigaiary
pressure, Ibftt Kapt all MMFVlMS on snort rations and snort . ra,
I forced thae I rftttjgN i id
not wholly a^rao, and. I . i'«lt wsr« not in t«« &*«
lei
©eat Iftferaats, 41ftt* B*tt** l fiscal
yaar 1 ; fat, and fcfea that touched off the conflagration
tftffttasj JohnaoR*.. tilling of the nave's imit tftWltx in
April in an effort la '*.%" from silita.r> •] :.:, convinced
aa h« *&« that BfcaA&A'i >iia was to goad Aaerlca iuU- spending
I,
Krupt;
. it -'revolt of the .. ~h
followed culminated in ariofs ' in the auffi&er aad
fwll of 1
.
, whiia spletei^ clan the i *te
i»; • , iao#d on record t I deal fti .onceming,
in fcialfml ^rthur . .^-.dford'a wordu, "the kind of »ar for anion
- iitary halations ( prallainar/ *. a,




U. ., :; : Tfl3g, Uanate, Caiuaittaae ;i and














Cob * ttea o. t ^e,
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..1, ,i *•£,,, -^.V,- \ :,;j\k ,..Sr :i<iii ' yOisr •: •»-
Blet Cong., 1st j«»a., 1 ..;..«. . ;i« laf,ur i« -eafter





fthii country ahould be prepared,"* and covering tue atrategio
viewa of th Ilea's -ry Isadora* ' nuut the tc- ogr,
alt'- .,. I I ^ows were present.- I cacy of the
o and : iteada baita" fata of -Airfare, there Itl tacit a^reo-
;fc ta&t ear strategy should be designed for total war
::lia. If !.:; a.de of lj '. . *ar. avy , in
§t*ivin>; to >'v continued 6 - P develop y possible
argueont, aid not oaks *hat aight have bean taeir bes ., fees
n«ed for carrier-base-;', air power I ited uara on %aa rissiands
of xa. is, pi. / letter ttiaa mny other eeateaeefas?
illuat ., lee . .tea the taaael viyion ladeei ';houe yours
. i.-jtiona, against a If retfad of sole
poBv i the eteal< . I aare , throughoat,
urge I int M the use of force, .e of
of annihilation, un. re the need to look to tat peace that would
follow a MV, and ©aphasia ad Cor a cloaa political-
.lationship—all elements of -~ u \ oupation
with a sajor -war with .e only foreseeable conflict
caused tl sirs debate to be per tml to Mm ^trttegie problea
107
of limited war. Iford accused the. ore© of
House, Unification i ~<.c^te
105 first tape
debate
/his poi:it . a penetr in
Lisit i-d jar, ;. i
!
•-*•* . i-rat^.;.. _. 1 fcl .*rly
a&airal sdford's opening '.he
osb "s rocisi
ilit&ry *l*eg»" but et&ted* H i an again.- *te
. 74-73..

- > - . . ' I , • •
prw- Rtlaontal tottearfl »itto a -
La« ..r . r idley,
, in h a a
tribute I . .
, , Often
ir coati:: -tion
wit - , failure In*
eontti k ear *i ia would





on iuick, 0*0*] victory by tha eto&io
blita waa a failure, and Cong]
oriented, I i.tive leren& >f the
powerful Bouee , t ill
are o:. ih«r ear,







»h. • • i
In the utf hearings, and at; .. ttlo
Tinman, ei
, ,
rioe, :t tha -hole strategic altered,













aabivalenoe. n the surface there •••sou little realization of
impact of th© '. written:
',.2 Governiuen ot
*ai no panic, «ni there **8 no need tot £©ney
vtion that
;o Hay] : >-.v>r cr Inter, ire,
it OfUM I » -i.it
it di I ire us to alter the I ur
;ro ra .HI
j i m m Hate pre
of •tratCtflQ dootrii , B» 1 If foundation *i , ratlMUT





restore our dwinilin. . rictic,
©ere* divided in their Qoonaell . .t,
sensing t .- . - ly in 6 i; ! ai , be a©'
;or'j of the I t ihe
112
security cl. list . 't •-...•;
bovever Li t: • a i« it
it tnti aintaii oal 1
verful nee -














;r«© involves, in -- eoieic .




roh, 1961), 2 ~; .

Likewise
he voleo II that ' ary
g war- , iilit't ato -.rent-., led
to ilt«? in the sli . - <s.tion with
11^
pro:. for a _ <? r rar i m,"
-.r.sibl*" true
ovlet explosion and bagait a searchir. _ew
of United Itataa strata .--:y—a review curried on in aeortr. ;«
Jcir Bf tiff, t (MrtO .'ouncil, l« to
ieh sw*a now can only be gllapsad in
114
outline la such records as the iheitasr h«- , rhia review
postulate forth:. nucie.-rr ll a, and axaftlttl
apectr fcfl its la
One branch of + ?" lad llltfi th* rsaia of tea EUboab,
as has bo^n described. k »see&4 • -nt
review, conducted pf it£ott*l security 1,
£•-« the entire political and str roblefc.
KO&thfl of intensive work through la* fall and winter of 1949**195< »
ijor, lon^-terss, policy re-SYaluaticn, entitled
_, was
complete! la April, •' : I document, nuvur pablishad, call«4 for









toa -.ar t p, 157.
114
:illia, tats. | . -4?.
li5
.ij_^.. . H - 253-5*.

hi tm i- .
,
likely in an age of
LtMur parity. It vottld rectify the ne&r*fai»X
llectiva t*Ott*J lion, ad
fellJ '. Ittt* Id .* defense,
loactiver li •... r**14t*t ft the
I soKt- | a over
it» i ??ere ,. Into full
117
roan ar intervened. Thus while tat;
. in a •da.-.-ocracy -inv
.ific^nl ture between t. -'let atoasic
explosion in . epte-ber , and fcfef outbreak of t' 1 .
It 1950* nevertheless t • if inac If
lev«Ied at the Adtti&ieUration aeertu unduly haran, . -dent
Truman*
a
u;>te, set forth above, eee&a MMtfel&f of mi btw>
neralii
,




it •«#• tte«tloaable IT, without would
have appreciably affected §B»a#ti>aitt bu selllllfe or ^e
fcure; hOWWeV thy . :.ii . taff work, d . . . -rved
as tfei for tho anozw iiitary raj - .1.
In Mm &ewll . an el -tsu war strategy far t. ited
roceso still W oocupiew rtunt
M.
li






vithin a ceii. - . iliion,
for a tt-*n-.iivi.K
. ><ry of 25©
a 4£-group tiy .-jixa, t«4 <u anal reatieti<




Ufti Uetosen 1{M - » I .!%•*! .security
effort continental dd'anse were centered on
mxopm, ntxh the jmub, non- . .
in our str&tagy only to aunor AipO§ t I B*1 rt
bot- Lt pg-lM for Um co^r. . ;., as
the : . ; ill , hawraf
,
wit . . _.;tr LtiOfl
,
lOVitofcbli to Liftlt our | ... elaawh*.
so to invite cawaoaiiit ex ; iito poa.ibla
tnat i oofiJiL! ic tivitioj in ur od
1^47-1.949 «v ro at**! attention tnare, and
divert our r^ourcaa ifl tfta critical . »*«
11 J
revolution. ' jj 1\<- , .onrerer, tht . tuuticn had c.
in two a i ,<ni ific.int t*/tt« La B*Of* '- : i INWB a imcceas.
?0«k~l .. .•;• ,. , ,. iaII tan, th*? .-arl"- lift,
and RAfO . i«d tu bleak pmafc ^ilitie:, of
:)viet . ,,-ion * „ . li k, tne coisplet;-
4iMnu.*u«*t t.
1 ''
;<ey araaa" ' of Iht .uraaian rieiania thfl 00
saw a ripe I e exploit kholv proa^u:-^ Bhlfttd
aeco: 1 >'.. l.y
.
119
Yhia point fcc a Unite tea in tfa
^orld ;,rgna, p. 17-'.
A &«
iolicv,* ;»
,« , ifojri and _ i i i tar;/ foser^ in thg_;,v_:P
court ( t'HC
.









' •.'lit. ;eta*0 •»• toward
rali , andad '.r«««
kary proftturaa, nevertheless an inert;. LaaaMU -;r-
ar thinkin u-
thJTOU, ^,( In the ace '-08
polio.





adoption o: a Halt* La. . '-, alt
me oeatii Latioa, owe raaaiion to actual
ressivo - 3 waa atlti tad,
our tv ftts .ift us no anawer to referred fa*
of ovifr . ,ts—internal &ubv<*roion t guerrilla oparatio ,
. to bo "aorta" &ll-OUt
--the ea n of I viet atomic device aat< ft powerful
aieal ;:od
•print foi te#y a 1 ??ar. Por ail ?.
Opt
,
-iwcver, ryonic vest:. rar
this i -i not be^n traaa] o 1119 iga




dvelOj-^'int : . - strategy the Korean
^ar occupies a unique and significant position, it st&nde aa the
oi* Halted war—the war that we aould nev ,ve
oeiieved ossicle, had it Ml actually oocuih se
ffcl ia written, Korea stay stand as the moat aosentoua
event of our arn, t-._ will not speculate at length on the
world-wide political implication* o: fc&it new departure, but will
concentrate on ,-nited tftt - strategy &a it sue applied
in t;us limited «ar, and as it evolved froa it.
A«erica has a long : istory 01' t»ein fj ill-prepared for entry
into ft9| ^o*8ver, in I it fcfcit has od primarily to our
ailitci. >ture. ll «.r not only our tangible I try
aiiiht but also our strategy Mti the psychological outlook oi the
American people ware c.;-
;
ietely inadequate for the »tr into
which wo sere oafcapulated. If tfete .^cy of fciffwfttOBio rt ion
as a deterrent to all for ?ion was do by
tha -> ieourltj .. . ie work on I
_,
it
conclusively prov >rth i ortta v.y
oa the >*, # r„?fv;-. Ifttorjf
oat wuu ine; ve as j , 90!tt«la»




of the strategy S B ion of the postwar f% ft, de
v
. f the cunctt- t oi limited ttr, ..an
reaponac. NNM MM improvise confuaed, and ?.»an.y leaaona
had to oo Uliomsl Uli kmJti aajr. ^vortnaleaj our I I -or waa,
in general, correct, a i.cv. vhlafc iita "to I .tell^enca
oven in :d not to ae* foresight." actively
re- t.ed foi*co, i loveloped aa & a J400
iicited war doctrine, a process which, einoe it wati of neceaaity
auperis&poaed upon a bloody struggle, waa MM ; - ore difficult
a it would have MMfl -.etime, and waa reuponeible for E-oet
of th© politicy-rtiiitary difficulties luring the conflict -'or
tha aftermath of pajWtM '.1 aversion to the entire concept of
.-;.r,
*3 true i ace, t a ;>ena8, c«nt«rs
the limitations concept as it r jyctives. On theaa
:.-r*m arid fVOSMl dills, strategy in the .. evolved fr
rrcw c H 'L;,-.; :t of k forces t. ,tlefield
2in a favorable p. -. , " to the UVMM ona v ilf
with the ultimate oUjectivca of the b.ttie, .. of t>. •, it
, la the balancing of at altb polltit
'. active©
,
;iiibrating of villi the risk of tot
war, lhat I uns and las. . orea, as as essence
of llftlta , :.< .
I drodie, jtjrata#y i in ths .l^jlla ..^0, p, 5
2
Lor jil, one of tho noat railective of ailit s ten,
definition in .rol.iiora and ...oldiarlrw, t or. .pit ar,
,
I J), p, 47. -* ia a J. aeusaod





9 Korean «sar m „iei ior which the JuterieM
military w*r« not tr it, for which lh# &n**ie*n [.«o;&.le, by
...
, ih -ted.
•as set with, a I :»e degree of success ej * .;• •** 'hehavi
better thin it anew boe xo,** the perceptive aa* that this type of
rospona© I not be adequate for a future in 1 or»a oigfet
• lie U£iiqu®neea an<i s; I a pattt r a *! age of
conflicts. ffett tne painfully slow ; . I of revising a national
kttggr be8*n-»and otili continues. It took, ua lit start-
poo ;rea— <srhy the . Istl attacked, ,/* defended, our
actives and . ,. lessons learned, Mi the observed
.--Its.
.uniat /wtincf
Little can be developed hare b- e of I
ae to the true votive lin m chooti ... . the
xt power fel thfilx , for
ise so , I "• : 3u.:ver,:i.,i, et




.cal tfeesit starca vl . .,*«*& ooapan oviet
expansion to
... & fluid strean which &ev«f cotititantly , wherever
it ! tt«d to MVb, toward ** giV** goal, ite
Beoeevt . h ran
every noo* and 09 available to it in the
I world power. t UT it I - unassailable terrier*
hi , it aces;;! : „
tthn.





accoasaodatea ifci* a those. Paa -ain tiling la that
t utti
pr ;eaired £oal„4
if thie is acoepte-i, Hit Mi if ost*e containment actions
in tfl could be expected >-ft
earlier.'' fca tow t. eific
choice »f i, ; the decision to call a atruight
power i-'lay, a go&& c .
a s^riea !-at«a act,
or, 1947, the iefa of l%*ff had cone} led
ir n Umi standpoint - . security, I I I tatea
ha«s little tS'fttagt* int«»re;*t la Balaiaiftll
and ore*," ana the,/ accc ly reeo; - ended ell al
6
of the 4 r , , -3en atatio.n^d there. La redeployment sas aecoa-
pliahe-i b. June, 1 , : ma only soae five- r«4
Aaerican tsilit;ry adviaera to a I training of the
7
•tan 65 1 -nan ara>y. e eye© of the antle
of ilirecs, iaevitaa responsibility had been lif tn . il« th





:-rtiy beffeva this »i1 tea forces,
ieral Itougla rthar, or for the Hiei £ow«f*
[ ] • ti£ii» - v »
|,ptra . eaap. it.
is JOS
^25*36 | alta related coa&enta.





in Japan, had auc I m Lro'z IsVQ ..:. ericas de:
oosara ots as to the
acce; >ta*SS .. k tion by rusher levels of the Unitt- tea
government, ..ecrav tostsea removed thea by his speech
nal rr«8i' ksrasjQ* 12, l.\- , *hen in •
identical ianga*£* n« reiterated the defense itn«, ttxciudin
Korea.
It would be unrealistic, however, to so. e policy
statements as the ''inv; I a" that brought ua the I . -<iet attack,
as i» so of*, i surged, foils ru;> ma t aoae support
to the •OJUBtWiot evaia>- R intent! , \>av **c could
no*. It carr r«ater voigfct in their intelligence
assassasnt tl the tentiona M »^11 as capabilities,
t with I froo Korea wae o. or. ftj* the world to eee, aa was
the fc**j4s$MM :tiy-ara.ea lottftftj IWIM areiy, with
tank.;, heavy arti t plane*, likewise the -septhe to sblOa
aserxc&n overall sjlaitftTJ roSolOSSS, had sunk were -y
asasured, as were the inflexibility of our strategic doctrine, our
preoccupation v, -a iefenee of ;urope, and the i iss of
o
OS the m oooobs an aoglo«»;>asda lake an<; our
S of defense runis thro:, .-. in of ielanria irx-.: - la* coast
. , . t utarte froEs I Loss an tinuc fts
Kyukyu -r -ago, whi :ea it .
,
I _ia»a. Tfcsa
it beads back throe sad the Aleutian Island c vO
Alaska." 80s York
, I949 t p. 22.
oorot on'a lir rect sjMHrioaa ssoarltj
ltas&t NMi ths \ to Japan, then to k i yus,
ice to the fhilispisssi I it,
t for toe | ritji - ?r ar«a*5 in the I te
reliance be bad * j< i of the ii .. liaed
wo: | . ' *jo 'Cl In




our undermanned and I liCNM la It ^rienced
y in c salary 01 Lea iutiea.
Looking beyond the itsd .states action, a
lg&lfj laiida* oviet decision to a i$t
have been th^ir possession of Mm atoxic bo./ . rati Faisal
of the at -iiance in 1950, showing the great preponderance in
/or of the Hast, overrules ,t&e thesis that the .Coroan agression
can be entirely explain ilaa entry Lata the nucle
are;
, Ml is argued by tile jx/3 t _hv>c f *V(Q prop ter hoc school
|
nevertheless the teJLi weapon in ttea owlet are*
undoubtedly rer.oved train to fros the Politburo.
it has been eug&eated, vita teae I on,
that the North acked , 0H their own initiative
withe I /.'iet b&aaell , Ifettfl MieuVBH nio a
DB0J tV< it had I . re likely, however,
that Raaaiaa I. e n&erican at
orea "worth" defending, itideed, if if
they I .-rica'e conduct of i" taraa
:hed it ar
sluelea than that the United it mmU4 .see in a Llaltai
siove of a at I lite aray tl :egio aoaitl
a c . .. an when he it in
This theaia la adva; . I ;;ne •Iddcn
.:tory of ;, : - ... riai Preec:, 1^2)% •.





to, ii^j , -44.
tacitly re c-ect*»d la John . ' . . ,-&acArth.ar_ uontroverev
eitj Preea, . . 1*24 1 * t £»tn t ot ai .
,
.-.rctr-'-. .11 ct -per and , . 48,

68
no position to pr*vsnt it."
Viewed in this li h\
,
rtant oonclv. to toe
. . i attac . , fWI the start, not an ft&ftXmt
trolled liaati ©ive,
into *ha to b« a political &ft4 fttAlturj vacuus.
SJlSL. i it&.tes FlokR 'Up t&< . tiot
r«fl -iora «mi#a,u.tio t ;tter
»ited „ «ere
•aitfl -iiri«.nc« wit . t #
<j field of lot wua net , the threat »ae set ^racted
a :. . . . The
bios? mm rately itrdly i our felia
,
v« beta fil- - t«4









.? problem M .vied oy the to k prevail*! in
>is a clever rase,
a f»i , - ijrce;. to
way w. viot takeover -
t
, (••tint v®
an £m it o& Quieted to provoks a response
•i* a vh. into
I 1 rtdr? - la all of UlM ... i -.ili ties* •>**
would have to be #i«i-;hed im any eas f .,.*:. It redness
;, p. 16%
15
3 isei [ , lucle ...

for this tyj.o of action »ade clear thin proper r«HC
«uch acre difficu, • iv« been in Jur;e, 1
i purely military ft . vi-j*, defsne- orea had
bse: lont , , - • • '•• - .. ea,
as I . Ihe ic; rea
•. the Joint Sbivfe of 9%afl ' Lm v-£
strut* -. r*sed on the assumption that
no eircuaetances would t ! .. &ed tatei ei^^e in the
1 A
ailit'ir,}' aefwate of linsuln." *his :ion was
no doubt reinforced . I
, ,
|jr*l -litary sea,
that "anycm *no ooamita the &eaencan aray :ta
out,ht to have hie hea^ exaKined." '
/urt'-.eleae when the attack oaoe, at ttie first aect;.
the x«cutive with aides-it iruaan records
"aaaplete, **•#•! unspoken acoeptancs os> MM part wi everyone that
whatever had to be dor.© to sect this aggression nad to be done,
M that either the united 1*1
or ibl -tee could hack away froa I ., M our atr .:
had failed u«, by the siapie ei | not .id
in tise of crisis, it is iajiOrtant to sxaaine the reasons ior t.




'~SJr,'W r , - t.ory
(;«ew Ifoarki are.. . ..... • •, . , .'.-.",
15
. has been attribute.; -r.
:.«e , -.,.... .- /lf/ral
JftLJk': ant, and th .re of
,
^-iser*. I^.ojr
(Hes fork i tarr&r
,
and i Lr^ any q i ,




v ur . , ' .
136-57, - , lit i Md ' -
16
ru , IX, *34.

forsuliit*. . a better atrtitefcry, by «*trapol nown
reaponaee.
.. m% t!.«K« !, I the fir
eeeea to fc© Uil at f*U I* Mil »•#• a»-i now
17precipitate a chain re n of aggresoion, k'he leeaon or
.cnurla i L, of I been eoll-learnad.
If this aggreaaion want unchecked, it would b« followed by another,
and another, leadin to «.orid 1,
It , ia belief, reinforced by the M4e*ljrifl .It feaiinga
te)V uaal of she I -' , i I the
b«c> . : l ioat o jidaratio:..*. It ;a an over-
alKPiii'iciition to •*£/« aa Q»£Ooa ha.» , that the uerertae eaa u-a.de
sr politica. c. rations ,*1 ra-thcr than
18
fceftie . la."
1 th political M ry
factor^, wi II itieat* .. oai overtones, are inextricably
bound uy i*
-
§•«•* - «ja wowld b« a
lirttin/-: at I rt of Japan. Coneldering tl ia
held li Alalia islar ;-H, Jiipan would ba caur
"between lower jawa <sai*n bear," J ?he
political conaa-.iuano«a of thia e \m\ advance upon ara«>rg





Limited ar , p. 1
19^John , oster , '*,. ;,iiit**iatio '*e
;t bulletin. July 10, L '/
, .
as also J >etor
'jullajs, " , i /uid .
,
tat
7. If* ... - .
2')






>ri->nUil M for Yimbiv power, i - now il*;bt bo m . -n©
t tho sntira i'ax-
LfeXaj force of cosmunis;.:. .-ut the I <m be
confined . ayea . ^re litar
on * iftoa, nyrnliWlf . ^r« fior« wo I m%$
weaken t -.ad wo. :. v«
diaintegr u Thare was no ±tion to
. orau. Ho* I frionda, MM »er© rtl
sec ti for atoll1 very existence, woula stand fir-- vltti
us if we backed down Ml MM (MM of WW .'ir-t . lllamfa
anerloa al
, JLl«a voala »«• a resurgent
isolationist, would er litft <£•» *«. -t>le, aj
famltj turn to neutralian in the face of seemingly invincible
.;. jiiaa:
,
M . trategic ,.ir i»mn< bases
aura aeci&red no;: .ianea of globi. r wou I -ft
aver sore to comsuniaa. Sey nited . Uttea, yet dependent
or, it, lay the Initfd IfttataM* iivo year* oil, it had
sively, and particular!, km r«ccu;t months, .. growing
re decrepit .a a ffeaa.il ^aian
intransigence. If I -iety of nations could , . akej oolioctive
security work la fckit kftteaa challenge, fcoraa
would bo the i«ath warrant of the united la1 ^ as -id
been for » united crion
would be tbo dectuiv I ,t.
John Foster ;ullco, xpal xcan aavlatl If the
just ret. :^yo fl




trip oi" i.oruA 9<tun attack case, ton
well expresses eelini;:i z the tiao.
It Is possible I MNtt*&*M
cc
,
way. If, however, it they cannot da bo then
wt used ITM
Lft - ji&n cou; iftii • Pit hf while
. orsti . 'drrun .provoked arK.ec.
st;-*rt lit&J aia of eventy leauim? isost probably
to world HUP, K •6Writ| ail ttij
call tor action on btfcalf oi tfca Of - I tion underm or ti us
are willing to r l#**
•btyt a it setsed a *!*• up or shut up" teat by the
coofcuniets, *ictent irusan calx a this "the tougheat
Ion i had to *&• as - r«*8i.;ent ," ' there aeass to have been
little doubt as to the outcc
Two . ts are worth further brief a: , - -,
sassiwe air-atu:\ie ft ->e, ftltfcdttgh possibly . lor L
;
-te«jy , MM never seriously considered. t«i for severe
lisit if the c it was . ively recognise! as au
•-, ae can be ae*?n i'roa* thti fact that She initial
set lrnctivee fr oan at
vvor Ml t to zhe
I area.
IM second poiAl deals w% relations with the
,
1 eea*i«vjr*%l0A« raamlt
that I . . .. . use hav*. NMM widely riau:. ve
cuaan, il, 53$« A -ie ... /en
in •.*.', •
-;, to
avoid co ;. tea.
?
Vttid.,





led to ^uch confusion concern;. rea. .;d
States decision to interv.
action. " Our decision was based ^.rxaarily on aelf-intersat. _t
was a power- political applic . . containment to .t to
security, United l&tlons u i waa vigorous 1,/ sought, and
ob-
, I at (It alt^r tfea c reason for our
Isltejvi liOAt entry ;lah,
in t-jr til J- a the color of • crusade.
It waa used I ton to cov«r the aeul poli tik underlain, our
actions with a cloaK of Bnpra ealisa, this rouul
I
a confusion concerni.-. li fcSHM interests that ama to bear bitter
fruit when alii cunea went against ua and the high Koral aia
ession incide wits the oat., arest
of containment. faia ispreoialaa la asyXninli r actions to the
blic not only contributed anaet) to th. fce
psychological after oraa, but 11 aa difficult the





roceed- >w to 'a
'.he war, on] will be touched *hich
relate to t . a of llaita or lisit... . . It ahouid be boi
La toe aaa ala be describe* i
war, I e war ey
•i£- .. pear on the surface, »je the sain o
;
Jvl v.ctives , a« *Jroais
2 r
tie point is develop -jhensively in . I, . ..^-..ted
^r_,
; . . } , and In ..*;itzei, , I, pp* 260

74
has pointed out, eere psycho, lay a a. It
la ta&a factor, aoaaoaa :t« lack of a atrato--
doctrine for llaitad aa*« l&at w*u rt$3i'0ns- .
cor:- fraatv I . - lldfl aa
latagratad eaetor plaa s out aaaa I j on a dny-by-
day basis, witr. . . i owork of t, .aral precepts
Baaaal Low auboec , a/ of
to -ar,
I99Q« "there i . it»; policy *.. as to what our
27
action should bo and how wo ser« goin l; to end thifl ,'
out General Kaaartaar'a ringing charge, e ia no policy— there
It nothing, I toll you, no plan, or an,y I ."
Keepin, Sod
the fcaainiati
the ®ar hi to lirait it ty tvarjr mil possible. Fresidaat raaan
haa written
i
very .ieci;.,. MUta in connection wi DCTttttt
conflict hiii tula one ate la • revent a third
world war Ms4 La destruction it «attX4
to the civiiiaad world. t we should
t do anyth "-no
Wlaaa and plunge the fret- nations into full-scale
all-out







a and the t-^te,
||
enate, ^ac>rt ,ur Ke^rin^-p
, | . i ,
20
'
. ruajan , II, 545 « . . hio address to the a of ^pnl .
l- r l, ident expressed s.uch the eatse idea: "la the simplest
tertr.a, what wn aru doi ii kkaal %t revent
a turd worl .... « do not aunt I . -<e
will ua« «very offovt to prevent that alaaata)

75
parent now, ritb fit o: . . this
j rieks 1 ve err ive
.;-:, 41 i»», Mil
ipev&orltj
*e felt »o cou to wir. -asia could no; rd
to lot. • :iat the ^oviets eere only awaiting an excuse
to I .&! war ao - Uj I fcfca 'a thinki
that they were Aetari - - to offer no possible pretext for ii ilea




intention*, »i .iatr ..tion it It extr«?rje ve
and rtbttr at the other, i that ..oviet ncv:
eoui
../ detk • •• . . '
. of all tha i: nj ta a
rsot be unie.<
, I . . ft of esa .plea will show
aide epe
In the . atic sanuuver, one of Hi I 'a
fir ci,y chargii.




- Lt to be too danger i .
...
. -uor tur
. lieveaber 19, 1/M, K . I - I tr Utsa-Supe , .-roi
Conflict
. . ; and (Llaai , iuclear ej . olxcj
,
, 47-48 • fo« • v,^i^-;.
^1
-
. 1 tary aoheao ..ue vital •:,antral
ever
r±*% nion arill | way rcg. re 4o« I
I taink that t w*y any aor
our 0*8 poli. . . %y? Ibid . . p. 1': .
52*,
:'ruR»n t II, 545- .
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>u^hout the conflict Um »ase pattern of polite n«»a was
observed in all iipl a a witr- the ,ovista.
In the siilitar. LA, limit placed upon almost
ev» , ao«i« - oa fro;:, which
political t*s feared. I m.j a c .in
on the A .- . m«v*!l Ifeta , .awn M tat fross
Iflifint with Wash-. I iaauea, staid accidentally or
deliberately e>. *ha war. ' lis is well suovtr. in Um lolloar:
exo'aan^e fro© tho a*tAs>thi) igai
Senator ,'ora*»
. . .
would it ; ,r tor a*
to BSS it was fait ia te
-.Eont rnaent officials here at
thy with
the reotrictions that were bein# placed u. is as
•
you,
as e-.ru t try of t .te, sassa* fearful that there was
a rthur, is exercieir
his field powers as co I , initiate &
actio I ia esj? laat
H the policisa of our country desired?
.ecret.-ir, ...... :- -
1
would be fair for you to conclude ... a theater
aoSMMri -« latitude.
Se cannot be directed it ti;:ulous detail; in
Lseretion and I think
there was worry OS s« savt that he would exercise
it. m lar&i
conflict. 34
AkoO' cii'ic: .-ilitnry lj ., the IMS I paranount
fall is ry. jfh.ee e
parallel, discussed at length below, at actity of the
St.
correct I Bl-rll** po-
wsrsy ia IIM tlaaslc sense, with I 3beilin#
troi
,
IS in tfssfcil , A aeab. the JCd t w;
in top civilian .-makers on or






a'ash .;, and affected not .t tha
»U{- I ae eeil. "'lot ^rcrai:










..ven aft •; en
pritory ;
violate t9*m M he
sensitivity rtjfeftC li&it «a ftt as
ult in tht- ex' - -Steele
borior i lf« of »*Uiy cxassj.-les ne
fg ot . 1 1.1
.'
' i -ition on I ops
I provinces Nfct to alu. *lt&j i u.r
attacked t^eoe "est: ibitic. ie
raeana and with ev«ry &v i, rtitaxi politics
I the .cmt to 6he public, I
Mi A4aini.tr Ive *aa . . »
tations regained,
in , est eon
;
i *a«* a m , are been
. la were the
sioet rtants first, .-
:




lack ' NNNM I
•soilanal o of , l iy the , *{«
a a to\xrzn oub.-*iiifi.r.v reason, ifcl /i«t retail-;
^an or a Japanese Nm , but largely 41 its
it."* His adia the I iieratxona that we had oat ,yet
developed tactical atoaia we
,
that the aa* of "cit -
^maters" la ana valiajra - ,r<s<-i. risked flu
fwctivo, «i*,h a M |*e*t dieeipati . the iaaonse diplomatic
'1
io than.. . »ral Taylor, »ith a
.mate knowle £ the actual decisions ana dociaion-
s&kitir '59Q8, rasa all v. / v It see era 1
hoe«Vv»r t that alt th<? ;ii>ove 1 . ms wo-. ve carried
coi:
,
e :;:otivu, its ar t t
lor run-use of atomic weapons «*< « .riding importance of
.
'
- and every aaM« It ll worthy of
note that this atonic Mia of a&reeeent in a feM of
sea between General the adrainiy tration,
:ier lii' , :. fall: ltio a tic,
or weapon a e&ploysssnt oategovla i fror. tht continued r;-fueal
to I hiaag-'s It: I an atW .land
r political aa well a si jaaoaa), to the non-i-roaition
of • blockade o ., .he non-
isapl repoaea rea at hose.
3b






I ;•, fhj i'ar t-u .-) ,...,.
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anaral ar always danied ..





Aside fros the ever-pr«; c . of expanding the scope of
cor , second re &'." Lying r Int m n©«d to
avoid dee;, involve . what was seen %o be a Sfcc is
resident
••If I '*.-"-'- rica's principal «r:osj.ies
•aro elttiai -\r*mlin, or M could not aiiord




•ington ejad eaa&ly aware of fca« need
sufficient f-..rco to dial vita any other challenge <>t
issue at aaj of a ayi ^ai tro-i ::ie-fjpot a , I be aeen
fro. ! . a curuu; - taaaatio I apers • *a«
years. *a» subjected to its gtaataat stress when
ftaval * applied ft* a grttlei effort against
sina, rat ola ::.iv sat of ..on*s vice
on lata was cade »j i . , at the KaeArtauv aaavJ , in
the foil-,. - ordsi
. . . enl&rgeaent of the war ores to i
. na wo ON than
anything' else »• c_ o. It would necessarily
tie dowr. irr
rial Oaiaa at ssl
Ii,
;
ed to pat a . te can into tho conflict.




to is world, rankl/| ii the oain!








nate, uc . 7*,1-
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In speak; MP the all , neral Hoyt ,. vaadenber ,
Wtt% conatanti. od *£***** trtttfc
.;
:
.ana in a- rt a*-.-., ria, net »•«
politics , »t fro.v th« Billl -it of
view I tlM -".m In ~r*we *ouisi iaatroy
the ~aave u»
,
uked for several year© to cope."
air l#MMft4 .ntiCt for 11 1 role— to
, or, II i Metro* 1 1 .
.dent'a deter»in»tl«wa not to ftSMUMl tne wir wer:t to
far that klM I - ' ..-..•-»•• I , _ , to
•a;) or t« tftltl jrovfe
^outh thirty-eighth -lei, I
per: it itoelf i in a i.e. <t
acousa of appeaaeasent
or non-a, tion . tat power 4s
,
Lly
Lead afloat getting Aaealj involved in "t
raralon" and time »rt 1 ».i£er. if a
thirl world war broke out, or even if m ;o»or bid were aade
i» an. *ter t wo »oi i.pleaa if of
AC
our force© oaaaitted to a aim -..-ay in a aec -/ taaatar«
. fti,
^4
',..-, * - . rjM Mil. 4i.'i,
MI&V ve ax r : i
fore re tied &** orea t /*y # Li sited fj &y
.' J-. 18%






^ve?; without I . l«rs, i tfcelff
. i-
•..,-... ^ • ry
w«&kn«se ana . o&l »ta xse
«• * MMOflftl -."
I'hua a sticc:
-Alii' ..
















"t« easiest *a/ to fc:e%p us from
xct in fctift«4t
?roua »* peaches Ml the ent trie-J. to tarJ
..a a till fcftgrJ
Jt IS jf
the
H»»rin^a . p. 4'
v ttilah . > , , ' , fcsd
-
' ^
V' » » . •
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. vfia, it wants to set* u» isolat-. . It aants to
trusted. It want. **e uu feare.i and
as # . . . If llfcf -i . I eere
tu ' , it
alone.
i 1
onit> of ree nati naion.
i ax lis** are tarsi »e are,
creater danger. If we act without
T*$&r£ t .o«e the , .. '. .
:
•'» Mlt
Vltfccut regard to the I t we face. -in|j
I /j it in
ce y rope «... f9ifif It silone U ht
wrack , the orth Atlantic -'reat. ,
it are
iMly! *.,. %9 tat o .
hat wo, . iet victory.
Ml I fall in i . fca . . ~cpose
la its - Ml in
MP. s pat laatiVfl ;j«cun;.
At
in glob&i . tive, allies ee.te of transcendent ieportance,
:rt-»ru:i m -run considerations. 1*4 the allies,
Individually and co.. '-'Sly, ***e categorically opposed to B
exte .:e, of 'he Korean conflict, iteoaal
f ear, still La rocesa of basic n ,
sac* t i in either ;uil-ucile ear ;>r >—yiilll
ovorennci.-ntr-tien m at. ;i t the outbreak of tne war,
our allies hai eagerly aought active Bsit«4 tatee intervmti.r,
as fMrt as firmly to collective security, w
- »et the
HA.ied .
eriaij M , , %h
-
,





- -/ ovarre t I
•
. . , La-
rtvtUiA i 1.1
I





i ; - tiatar
i«« landed la ft&fl ;-*at«d SStfcl .;• Ml four-
dajr at ri -3,
,.. t<«d ,tions t .. . ly
-i«U- CHMT alii** •
i font iXy
«ith ttlli rt. 1, when I
. tion • ;ri
,
a ralttataAt
• ly oa1 ::«






Afr. U'ies. r«str of Leland
» II • 3
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a,s a triv. ; iective iaaajrJ ta
tag ar- b&oia -al
pr* cqq to w: . • -
is «f I i n.

M
nV Ion of peaoa waa accepted aa >iich to
!8or any -le fruit
illla-a and fr . ^reforo,
•rfui J rc« waJ it be -
tlon*i '.sep the allies
etivs? of so,ual * ure with, eni to
so-se tagree ovi fla < her two rs&jcr ;oah availti
i n» ki i ta.
. on,i tbe P Uvea ne above
eectic- , ' lieteat in very littief >*e
ov*:>; .
. ; 'beat jaeribed
as pc
,
^r to re tho
three prlaary , , strati marked or. -tenaive
.'..--. i with ae< , all f. -i.ng
to aalaaee I Leal goals with elllt r aa the
oituatxon eheaged. '• i rtbur at] :ia
i tailing 'lows, u thai ttrution's conduct of tixe
»ar baa been rexraooaly at . rietf axaniaai £ the
rtainly would
a major issue la *ar.
oraun conflict has Lea'a fir
at * .uaewita Bathe* than
18
•* Leland . ; the
,
a« York; Council on
pp. i^.:-6y l 1" , rallati »rk

6$
,53ff, ' at ualr: lore* as a nnX




oft«j: I . . nilit
.a conflict, *hen he, llMt
figure of t <ll range.
truth war i I a fta* ,-oiitica.
brought about by lb* dif: I ita)j or utilities, that
•y»l ; ac fcrtlttf mi .iuatr%tion Mt>><! to vari.roa
political goals. , &r« will - slow on thia I
In at . rthur*s position., fcM it la I -riate
horo to examine the I r.,
aouns an.. ...ileal Mlt, aa H I c*v:itr?ii to MM of
what tha saeon.;. bieotiv*. ta war *«r«.
I Karl von 'Jlauaawits uo w
sane.
Mi subordination of the political point of view to
ailitayy i\i t fa* poliaj haa
. war | po.i;,c L« ant faculty, war
act, • t th«* rev




In applying this to f.ne Korean ar, ^ration
tiaaally triad to kaap i subordinates to
their political ^cale. i-rtin a#*M expreeae* it* *fhay
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coat oi victory, M to be sure that they wer« not buy. I at a
price wni. ly a?er» unprepared to pay.''"^ However logical this
may |||H t a MMM*v*i c -r, wiii MTH 1% It MV MMM
aewita. IM *1 goals were eetatiiu? , «ange<i, and rejec
baaed solely on the e&ae with which they could be reached.
benertil KaeA*%fcS9 - .
,
I , Lfftltiftf in a politic
9ft#«uv« v,r. ... t&i eetinge at tae itloAel eeurity Ccuaell
M Ma£*Mf supreme, with the .,'trtte M>MWtMJle saying that
-I'orrw'i not la m ;.itical objective*} el Ml reapeet to
Korea, until »ilit-w tiee were este. e4»" while the JeJ
C hie fa of «itaf£ were S Lftion "that a ;,oiilicul decision
afore Mere % he suitable determination of
5b
military courses* of action.*'
ilaoaNA m -teed I - ;hington
ri^ar;, .Tee, with tht* attendant I 3<jco
ones cu * ; >ich the Mtvtal fighting Hinged, MM can be no doubt
that i careful appraisal of ilit I required before
eatabliehi. ,: j - la elans, but to reshape the latter continually
on the aucceoai!^ or settaoke oi fottjl in the j is,
in the last ftna! , to leave | ,-:.-r ,.oi*oy decioions to the
initiative of eneasy action. History 1 M surer MM
Hare lay the true tragedy of our failure to d Ml war
strate-y la the few t ta had bean allotted.
ltd M bat ;<sctivea.
: n coherent i ., -it of fa '-







moving ev v.»r» in *s ten so fixated on their priaary
obj< I -. NMMMMI 11 .i.«r.t attf I
coula lUMMlt of cotiaieten*: vea
to guide MllltAVy action. As a --.mdary o'ojectivss were
allowed to fluctuate M i it t*rit *i9 ssilit.
sit I ftflgr
I would, Ipeo^iactq , upa^t the limits
.
MMNMHti «r to I of specific aecon '-,r„
.
*jetive&, their «. B, it MhttMt to -jised
that thsae were always -ted to the three ry
ono liMKMtfMl above, • ll#* objective was siasply
to pvftfl t reana bacfc »croos the t:,irty-«ighth parallel,
or, in irsfaldent '.''rman'i word a, "to restore , oace there ana to
u
restore the border. i -tion to achieve this &oal , both
AiplMatie Mi ftll I . , in Magnitude, step ^p, as
the situation level : the at--
oral <*acArthur was ordered to evacuate Americans from ;.orea and
to provide the MVtfc r'.orsan aresy with au . \
and tta SVMtJg Kleet, M -ly« *aa -ovant
the spread of the Let It • osa. I United II I -soluti
Ln#4 calling for a ceay „ .•:.,... . .*:..-, ck
accelerated ami aoopXet< is of the Jout
57
"An (ratlins i oi ': otivG.
,
iters
»csd the •, or wi
'
ves





t^ Ltios oi ... ferkl John II ley ft.
Inc. ,~ i"> I,
58
' k. IX, 341. Phis work (pp. 531-464) *l*t ..rovides
for the ev«nta related ir of
this tuesset! • , tal#« rwia® i*tsd«
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unont, the lent advanced I r aajor ate>> and authorised
belligerent action
—
I !M*i4 vui forces to
: t (Mil in troops. «*o i-ointd here . rthy of notei
firtt, action I AM in advance of any United
sancti
,
>us o; roun;; force
aut iiloa avoided K If us irrevocably to t;u> *feoff1*.
a 27 our draft r= reooas&ending thu . L«tte
raeebera furais 1, stance to ropel r<»« attao* was p*»*04 by the
. acuritv -i.
situation . aa worsened steadily, and on June Vj
* resident KmMtii took 11m irreversible &tep and authorised vl
Jfac^rthur to c grou-. oes. action was
actually tie LflMBt of all the initial deci
when the Jar >a«t floiMUnrtu reoooaended it, the president authorised
it I . iteiy | request at five in
the »IBlllJJ. without any lengthy co;uu deration ir 4 >n
wit liVijjera. .nee the full iftpovt of the stoa could r.ot have
escaped the >OMt f It MMt Da coaftld -hat the use of fMMf
forces, if ft—isory , was, in il -^c-f xecutive's *ins, implicit
in the June 26 •oloioa to use ^vaerican aiiitary force. 'nis being
RO
"This resolution, as ^rovi of
July 7 **ts>ois*Alaf Mm U*4t< lioa* oommmo , 4o possible
;
ui co / Sirs ces: thu m] uous nature
IIm attack, tue fortunate presence in /.oroa of .o
,
able reports, riot boycott
of --icurity kour.ci .




i it would never have been &ade. ,or an excellent ,,«ion .








_, p. Hi . ''<;. ,
and pp. 235*?^ (Ooaoral ft* 1 ! tJinHianj).
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tLc 1M>< one aa,, . peculate or. ..ability that in
Cut.. . the coss; - I J M|| MNUMt) of the military
I ic»2t M>J OU kitMfil of ':«rs, it
use provea neoea«»rv or . r*tbie. r«a an . si&ie
to limit -.rugfilo to x. ; -il.-, -r , as MM be
eeeu fro June I , lay, , :. view |
which thi . is*. I :ua as a
terahed point" Mil be ;l.
Up to thio peiat la Vbis ">r, fclta politie*l objective had
rasained co.uiant M I orce waa atea.iily Incroaaei, and ae
I tttgntntl ...... and the
t#£anaiva struggle at iu«an, there was no change in the announced






an t e. u eIXua . --. ith ral
tac r'a brilliant . victory at ir.chun, kottfi?) t,he
-j
I ;na fov.: ©nt on the offensive and Hav,»nced vita
et*irtlin f r tt I taala>, confr., ..ngtors with
the r»eea for nmrviof aaa>t II . stoat critical
q1
deci " •** f not to stop at IM t ;irt;/-
algatfi purullei.
.<*re tare kfcra* 8<M palli .inui*.
?o Stop I it at ill toj •/ coiifi^uroa for
defei;.-' , sa4 alia* M . - &iata
tip for raaa*a4 at all41 . 5eaon«, the urga
idous ical lages that would accrue
to t - atioftf iv<a* *orld froa katal v




since site iiv. r«A was at the root ox the trouble, M
since UftlfloatiOSj .ad bsen a 1 object: the United
too ob t, -i.ro
) ,
there oas a stHMf SO/&J tan urging the
aoiauro of .ocoapliah bv e.iiitar,, force
•hat the ^ovists had prevented b/ anv no,
I i«, counseling a halt at the
parallel, so •i«a , e
general oijmsl
m
8 li»:ulihood of tnis could o;.
b« ©a* titrated, usin# an objective calculation of Coausttalsft China's
reaction to an advance 1*101 sroopo toward her aenaitive
Mimchuriaa border, soil as an *f*.i*rois ol t ant warnings
ohe isamod* :ile there were crosscurrenta o. ion at a.11
levels, fro© the /.r.eric Lie to the *tions, the majority
view al'sOiit everywhere w«*s that dota-auniat > in no position
to intorv t&rily, I *ts w©re chiefly political
blackmail designed to influence %hm fort vote
on a resolution to unify .-or . iso adding weight to the
da . . mood the taosis tigad
our objectives and aAvojMMd toward .order, Baa iaa fait
norsslf ; to
recognise her uxistync*. ,j for ^urviv 1 e* Yor . ur and
ftyothsrs, ), .5%
given by the vhinaae
, .. . «a*i| SO WW iaaiaa
... ;t4
SOS croti.;«d the tnirty-elghth parallel, China sou
»&n& in ...
, thie &c
wou v the parall . .
ns of thi m are
iilits, .
-









unification side on wan the f«l .x-
biiit rthur Is" stroke
hon {•» at sou.. 11 /ice) had in a few days
ipiotely rti - 00 ion ttyth, . .".rue,
id .snerai rthur, by JuliWry * . . on
to MatiUU rth. MltmU
thv i. •: .era gafe h.i icient latitude to conduct tactical
E 'ttiona nort , 14 fast below it until t
I nI riftlim m -. na approval on
ctober 7. --ive days before the resolution, when General ^acrt-ur
proposed tnat the cj the ace for the issuance of a
drarsiitic n ace^ent, lifl to 'proceed <?ith
/our o .. i.oaa without any further explanation or announcement and
let action aetoraine the aacter, ur government ueoirss to av. I
hav ; aafce at of the }8fca .-ur^Hel until *e have
accomplished cur -iaaion. '.. replication that Waahington was
ft*l#*pti&f tu "put on« over" on t , .-it
theffi thea with a fait aocospli , aade General -ac. rthur raiso hia
eyebrows. * tot - o&'s e>anettverin#3, las later
criticise froa abro is intervention » it
of a foolish • iMMU 1 Bliltajrv victor/ is belied
llM overwht
-
iorty-aeven to fiwa vote (eev*?n a' .«)
in favor of tm plutioft, .. • actions i..
political objective C I ear in £orea had bean cnan, .i: the





Goodrich, p. I52j i anier, p. 102.
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e^atua <uo; fros3 destruction of the enemy's arasy to destruction
of hie state.
In retrospect it fall icanoc of the
thirty-©. & ayabo 1 of lisaitad *ar r-^ciated.
Mftat ot the political objective aeeas to be a classic
of "how t- it actually choosing," or at It*
W MMUl it anjfir-ed like MM desirable, logical,
easily ob >«t full consideration jf I
ifflplic -itiv..--'»3. lesoa .-so aptljf put it, it «aa a
"target of opportunity." HM objective was increased in ax jac-
tation of an Mtj victor,), u-n *h< -3 was denied by tne "nut
launch^ , Hi III t# our
odiatc , hout a tte cmslve limited
war strategy. In «>: >ur political objective without full
ilatioa of it . .to con/ii a **r I
Ml Of lilt csy-:. {i-reaiitfo c< kt .ade.
gambled on tne Chinese it Okla . ad
,
we dec too hi* wore not willing
to back our | I . , '-hat I ice of
ro treat to1 em&tlonally and in teres of 1—1 lie
tt be or than I vice of hole1 i«t
I objective. fbif is
,
ly,
jective either should or should M)t •. va been ex i,
•>nl II at ' - . *©« a: -ts
was out ele trly OtMMtfv




. iaciaio:: ut ond here, however, m M
I iir : | otivo. *rred





point it MM no longer cle; r vfcat our tf
»ii , | oar t
'
on. fh« a* In
.r forces fro© i . itar,
.-;h thi ill Malt Hwa •vaaaatlao oi la
to th& -ac.rthur's earliex oeals to carry
the wa.: :i». £e th*5 *a* ..ded, V • >aia stabilised
on a ,: - ..ixiaujs dasatfa on MM | , withdraw
to eucco • coci^uniat attack increa.
ia intercity, ana finally wm to Japan if naceesary,
,co "victory , • .• • waa r a
poaaibility in laatela "3 view, the ; resident sade & «c tal
effort to explain ti ... rfchur, in a lengthy net
«&a bein^' I I r#a>« in t;
.iiaxaader's opinion, these ...
adequJ- ,1a for t, to who . ,. tical
basis an n&4 fo» tiae . . , [> uot ]
quickly delineated, fui ft&4 bo isipalll:
haaar- attle are cheerfully accented.*'
I, .- r th« auccesa oi ration
Killer" . I aa-teimi ;.. . '1,












MM • - t >ujr | art, « . ,
v« alw^s boon, to MM} I n«
jo b«f
,
. ft KM ill
to rih'.r lit April,
fM to soil fth<. r :ta-
















inv ti.ii -on re.'
ti»«j to do ao,
• , • .,
»•»






iejrk who ec r th« i"a; in ,
,
. ity no: litarj
."coa to achieve victory. I structaM,
71
every effort to**, r Lleing an MTliiUM
Gooei ..r' a roai tlon
.'-!::.-: ir
Lt in net t ;«) the subject
.. ia©r t I war thinking* bile
rthtar, a^ well .a©
, edVOQO f i Ut,
too, t3tr 'd ait .. Otlvee bejroi
72
lives. He 0| otion
. in border. ! r -ted
oer»v tcel*« Re opposeu
...i. He opposed eg
are. , . lift} »rea
of 1 betveMra .. «n* I -r'.,' Lais tret 1
on /e ata. . *n
felt t'Ctivfi il 10 of enesay
action, m iambit s*e" |m le et r
. to iej . . ir it
71
7<?







i fi Bd, . :i ; --L , . .
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'In i befor* jre















proeti, uey tu th« vi;.itoi , ... v *t the
urtiS, ^«Hcier, which -s
dissieual, he n-ate.t
. ~ . . proven





Vork : .*-><;.*>, July *;u, i • ., . LI,
- «JT| i- . "Mi - • utes t






















H—mil i I - bio,
lj vault avt.
.






it it fr ,
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her* raavlti&g xn inability
:
3 I vir gQ Ml -
'.'.'*
. . . -oaa
•
: **} afttnae of t; .
... ~i©ly
3« i I it 1 •:« * £ , -,<*r» »C.
- k« in any
liai« Ltjf
to . . '.. . i t on I . - via I ^o
•aa 00 great, and I . NT of >ur triKin^
82
e« was 00 positive, fat t
bal U 2a, an
.
: m n«vor
fea laratoa , . Lj|ht that n« kc
in favor of the w*a tne rajac is
pVOfoaala ;>?> - , . . tftt he
-*rdad *& Ileal
ich aa . By life," -' was rga
MMMnur« a prof. I -sling of nia pa .:
JUl^-- •..*:- t , ::• lid
M i'oiioaei
it| La teat va ara
aval v; i r
vii
, viafc of aa* »1
a .-oilec* »-y
„. — ill
at B«i iaaa sfltfctiveneea in
a* ia ttr«







til by our I ,-msible military
aut








. , ilai oi" en or Pitaum, our t*o
stain si ;.'a t or air ttoikftt I t Jap
a#lM and all t, oat :.>, oouli hurt ua
inordinately. receiving aistilar vion- ivn viawo area,
•**2 r had I a a» ". *cal &ad
,iw," ini it MM this concept to M
»tat«at.
k] aef initior* whic MM? d«cad*»
ic» ultix&t©
.cs; that whan all other political
orce?
of oentroi
. . . fca th« control of
the ailit^ry. ... / ttata that
when at* .\% % that fchure should
b» no artlfiet andav , .h
. . . .
dac* »« i'or *i . ...
tl«nt . extensive ta»tiao*.y ar« - , ned
in »
... ., • 3 -
»
•f . ' -'
lioljp the




07 iat», .rthur . . -->/,
. . .

1ai« thi> etafcaaat, . MM Of itwei. 1
r ift I Loa rest .'-•'• are fro® I it«d
war caicp, ft
review of id i©
diifei '.ratio, ree, -revolving
gftetaj titfaifieOJiee Ol the - , an analysis of a
response??.
,
• aili :-«r»t <:• J action.
B*%e irvnodi . 0*1 af '.h of the
tho • le l«ai»o?:a I
etreleg? t- . '. | v , >i**ro C .
outlet for iva student of war I re
inc. ' into . /oivassent ll Let
civ«. ih« eoet l
kv it.i-i;*-,..r:cr poeitlvi
<;»r:; c |«*
power retfejr t. r' to i
... it;:ont& to
Likee?it»a, Korea k of
,
for while it
^edly won - 1 well 4 we a >ea, it would
hav urr«fte4 at all.
y f ll ih.i I ; of
* a ». ailitax orae in June, l. : - , M rere
.
. ^ , lootrj . ... ,
£&£££* Ha rile (j«, . ''
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Our ground forcae war*; woofully eaaJfc, riy ftftiMi
. tely | ,;:i. t :B»a the I j.tieo of
f*c .tirir' . -en, IftitiVfl . iotxa I ea
rai
in . units*, itnw fcaeti »rt proved poor, probab
r\,e sj»«i«uro tc ;verconcentrati tratet





tot . kill I i t *e i«rt dangarc;.. frM the
. pat ftn#tt;;o.a«at, loroa »ho**4 a* t aa n g als. . need




. tj . t r e-
: ^«ti wfta •vlf • onsider*.
. t-rift&Iiy, I I I I ravo io
atill un-iars^, a workable
Halted w&r strategy, it M left the; je.v .-It postwar
ion an .
i roaa was i . tly *ot«4 tattporariljr kg tne "»&..
re , th«
to olour t*ie w* . ... ^ ot .. r«a,
-f.ee aost &ro.ij to a | taftdttl choice
twean . iv«i8-»«.ii., 8tuie.r>at8 or Hi,
:u8m i i >- al tax tiad of fort
go it -- - , tuae of <
ia,




1ftl j.3tory ee hai entered a #ar la bewilderment,
not in a ac, . I altefaatlvaa la •-. feal
or pr'-.-tr-iictacs n wi ft . -
re bo I i unpleasant tt- .<..*,:. •««
,
...-: I :. kid, the- idea of " La# *here
M eejgaa , " of &p$>ar . . jbing notnirit-, 'it it
glfcla, I idea of li&ited srar, r, during
for, H y aettlir.^ for, objectives short of total victory,
was coaplfttelj ::e* to .''.nt<ricti, an.. . xa
,
»Ctives lasmiatr *tion vastly a<- what eould nave
; % alo* and aaiafal aaelailatia* in any oa«©. ..orw, u*e
pel. ; t-'iat -t, loft La I) ;ir
eaer ivocal truth: fc&a country >eated
to I rial© of Haiti t ffilli
j k if mmtr/i aad auat be kept laforaed of, aad eeetj^t,





. iaaatal I .orican
•n civilian
..re
of , otiaa fcaa! Led










coapatible with continued civilian control of the rj an
I control ov^r a I ^usmandor
are the Haltie oaaa, At ftopei'; -are with
the battle V a be t.




:ntroi, usurpation ea a r/
• :,evertneieaa rti&t«d»










;<ot i'ro« I ..... ut frocs t, . jral'a
entire I hear , as woii ao uis coasaot oi the
war, .-. eeea cause I rave cone-, a anawere to tho
above .
i
Ll llrr. tuti ,
urea, or oaj tajrtfcmjrl ail* tl
ono vonaar how »e ifngaxl to ealva^e as su we
.., between the Cccasander i; E la
the- , i t f e»
aibie. £ne%e« i aal c aee, tarai ,




Viavaalnt, ...eciiio .saaplea are al&oat . :ae, & roa
.
.




1relief. ..-id© ft totta e; . - ^rencea 4 ..
ttpo: «ar, v.- lal oriaia ignited in this
country ovar the
hai.d of t a the
extreme. Urooa to til - . t
Jlaoxirthur ai Mfl his I ,;e
actional
La existence a new ana he: *« unKnown
oonc, >T«s*brtr& of uur OJMMMt





a could fee »* - .
•s&r»s f nx
'
j ^utjjcs ;li?.\ , anoi if we
to rctnir. civilian control
.y,
without
•1 t • - l:i.
.
. *i th ;y of
110 to it, OTtirOiWlBj L* inbred




procU- »>. ill L« | g rial
t
. guarantee
faiiux ar, for or
-
short of !•%*! victory. ahat it la, I
51, ?• 12.

1Korea will probably sew» oaly a MM | review of future e;
the vein, and whilfl this is a r.eceeear a ii^ocratic
•at oft ry
in I f Dees woi . in tas" •ifxtre'.ae.





aatvork batweea *aahingion and
the field eorman&er i lt»4 *MT«
it ttri;
experience ca»e not war, but fro... the peace negotiations.
It wa^s hera that we sad© s conflict,
MM to nwgotiate 11
relax ir. j our ailit i war *u ha oat
instinctively followed the practice, vital to lisaited Mt| of
saintaim it »*th the MMBSftt
our lined of ooatauniCcifcion with thea open, ft wer** not so wise
in our M fcfeif csnt,,;ct,, however, for SI I 2^, l< r l, vhon the
Russian delegate to ions , Jacob «alik, i
*.o speech that t <•... - -fire
Il -r.reft, our distaste for an ur»^ our intense deaire
to bri- t seenod like senseless fciXiiai to a close waa so otr
tnat we ti MMMt § I looaoy, I
I ce froi ". ion. as *u n&lted our offensive »t ed
,
we alao removed the I *ve
they bad to . aoe now that the Co&auniut <*»e aray
In thia waiter jea "the beginnings
ai I ; . . in a Lie— n*ae>*ji a safeies .,-ithin
the arrsed i"orc«.:f oefeween the pneruia of the 'fearer ..





ji V.", 1 ' I , ; . 17.
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facing as in Juiitt, 199&I *<-*;» "in * wruly desperata r«,
under large-seal*; , a Jasie© . ieat,
i»<•! M klMi t*li9V«4 fcbat ao&Kttniete
•«r« defeated Mftft fchet tfec . - -e« ci. ,*.ve
94Wereael&ed . In th<* v. 1 Clar ral
r ui' d*V i .
, ,
,ry *o
have been poeftltle • - stable i a in effort.
rtber tft " >4, owever, and * bitter,





enaive to end the ear by oomn&ista
Let vtt aiatake, be Lt iiv< ,
Btei M aettioaeat and a p&alie
thetic war.
orytyi&l tae pffoelasa «u faced in the KttffitbB -ar, one
questions the advisability of ftalU >n allies to auaiiil uu in
*'»
_
;y in the a jaglie -, . Jl „ .<»»
source ie the 1*0* interrogation eoric ui master of
,
..'' eoti
•t aoldiero we Hptured
gale

















^Clark. t pp. 69 » 82$ t4 .. l*A#ff Ji>y, -;iow t,«aau^X3t&
ee York j Lie .. , ' , »• 166, ' - "• . ^enteral




wou re been *> utter, feewave? 4 fcota I ,




future 11 . war*. t*itt1 I roedo* of action* the
frioti- i between ftrt t lead »»d vn I :*i-
cultiea, alj live action. • developed.
as»on# allies en/:ag#l ll I ll«**mt Lfl for Survival




al&ht expend Halt the war. vhia one
experience, a.ivic© neens sou. Ml he oouneels*
;r allies' istt aro clearly involved, it
is fa* battel to lf4i to hue band
teir st .--»
useful deterrent in itself— .ave th«» av le
to swrve at i ri^e shea wither
eara I %o negotiate a settlesent.
Final;
, rM laa cauldron I flraa ee have distilled a
number of strange s>rew» rslatlfl f aspects of future
li»it id strategy field, it is tii
a vast!.. tatstaeat favat ly
deter, for tly a rewtrair- a of as
*a» ft eist Stt -<aliation,
few bo3 b a an; to lot igs bo ote
«oratorius3 i at
iriably be used in any future
ct, am ta that we sust press** ir no
use »& for I use. tuary, a tfcfoaaaa] 'he











a good diecu. La point.

Mi
corrospondi:- fcaaa as* ai* power to an ancillary role, together
wit iity of llM baaic, BlaVfaaaioaao' , tactical
aaxios, sac »la Tor fikflN liaitad wars. rotation
troops, assigned to provide a s olatioii to the
problem oi' a limited war too I for tht> professional military
too ssall i*or total . aasation, read well and aeeiaec< fclaad t<
beeoae a ball MHril *J lac aga of llaitai *ar<3. it produced a com-
pletely different breed oi soldier frois that af tae fo*l ..--a aan
who fights, as a professional does, fcmm he i.i told to light, not
becautit? ne identifier hissw^if aaaslatali with the political #oal of
the war, fa* difficulties wa experienced in spite of the nagnific&nt
performance of ... orcan forcee pointed ominously to tfe* near
lapoeaibility of I Lag a Halted war arsong a, .ous population
not so ff .iy iaoued with the will to t*#£at« fclaaat transcending
all of these, however, waa the recognised need for a better under-
standing of tlu aaaaqr* view of the aggression *8 *
aian rust; to t;n@«sh us in the wrong theater, aor aalft to baa idea
that the Politburo wa I M exc | •tartiag a world war, our
laata of the li^yiih. }»e intervention, our excessive
touohineaa over la* aassisillty viet entry into tne war, our
appraiaal of Chinese ailitar, I abilities at the tine o. i-
atione, and sany -sa^or judgoents now sees to nave been Mistaken.
rov« once aaeessaent^, i ktea capa-
bilities tad the intentions cate^orico, the Halted war 1 u aee-se
4ark.
dsaults of. the ^orean ar
mm of the lessons of Korea &t ts*d above **i :ir*mt
Innediately ; y,o.ny , however, i ured for a tir.e u; the
profoundly disturbed psychological afters&th of the war, which
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produced MM ioua rauultr. Mi Mini internal nchxeae and
tioai asant part of oat of horea muddied
the ot .- waters-, noes' such i»berrations ae a reject i<
of l^ait&d war and a *t «med fnith in i.r power. wne
of I I ^ration's ittron^eat points in t lug ,
concisely nded oret&ry MriMMOA, • on
our •£ alte of cor.oiu.iin I the
wi&hed to ubs it cu^ci-idaci « tat we ..re too
Aivl til ami of tfeat tiiae. !•• itorattgies red
by the score, s ivo atomic war to a withdrawal
to "fortreae /rsericu," an i (fee phanomnm of I :yiaa aw;.
the land, feed.- rouse... orca.
.e political AJ a that ;8
continued, and soil* t ;$ bit tee had not generated enough public
pre^jurti to revwrae the aAttJUaltrlratiom'* Mttree i'or a
negotiated nautili tic , ey nonetheless provided the
Loans vith * m tore of political MuntBltiOtt, *hi«h »
used effectively in the al election. IMMHI oa:. be little
doubt that popular dlesatiofaction with the sr.tire Korean affair
wus a ftljp m% faofcor in ending a t*r©nty-ytfar reaocratic onopoly
on |j .use. in MtaljTftia j rooult, and
the BftleYtJ ii of partisan politico H ^tea ware, Hei"
perceptively---- ^sturbi: ^ly—-c -a: "it to olMM that
if there is another unpopular Halted war followed i* loss of
. tional ai aoaer, t lilty
of the Ballet states to ri.
:






utAlesate, oorabiaed with *vy expanse of .&e
prognostication of oven bi^;«r defenae budgets t , ied
inexorably to the clamor far a new and better str .. t.9 C-:y, for -ae
rganiaaticn, and ohaentf ana with
th<? ;i«ipUfcliv.
.n#« things," Ctt&aive retaliation followed Ukfl night
the day."
feut all the results wert 'vhe tie^.ativ . aggvtsftios
had been met and turned e*«k, ai ->rea was reyfcored
to I ;««ir I ries. **n enlarged conflict had been avoided,
ae Li*d the -iear warfare. thm wynil 7<f
ree ye&ra and terribly decir.at
giving the rilll ia a vital breather in which to deve
a decree of {.clitioal stability. ' ia«
bee; erved, their i i'riendahip tightened ly the overt
.auniat aoti aeir military pifff raatl -aaaed
ete<-v. -iraaaent progres. Collective aeeurit/ received
a strong shot in the N», *rx I iat and the security
treaties* with Japan and the Philiapinftt being only the r'lr at three
a tieriea of interlocking defanae agrea^ente inii *M«
Mew life whs bra:, a a f itad I tue
. .rt in tne salvation of the concept of
rnational organization and collective security. iMWI








for an excellent di: Mat frustration Qi an
uadloe-
treatlea envisaged defense fey atr&U Llatios,
no I te .

Ill
all this had been dons at dissipation of our solitary ±:ow©r
in a peripheral struggle,
it bops wdi* "hroOfch tnie type of effort,
continued frustration of oviet aie.a wou a the
adopting a sore a .-. • , • , una expressed
it, "no ayeti , .,t---U; ; ;:.;., :alarl^
;n--cnn face fi te!« ». eventuully
adjusting II .1 one way or another to the lo^ic of that tit&ta
of affairs." _i fti ...ecrat . -son »a« it*
. . .
what *e Htl -lo is to eroate situations of
at* if . . . than I think t.h tola situation
in the world I I ao far aa the potenti-
alities of viet Union ubie to acnleve its
present purposes ia concerned! a.-. liange
«# a toaitia
of Ilia various parties, • should hope
there would be a ia of (
tin to raa §e the facta which hawo tec I
created Lfi to aoive
at lea.*t aoffie of I ties between east and
east. 1 '- 2
rnlle, is.
s?vt>rai re taken which
afftjctea to iiited war strategy but did not r«l, wit





-^f tor the at . -...rtv.i, «:-.;eral Marshall was
ttlvt •. ro place Louis Johafl
liefenae. >a ead ol
Johnson and leedfetajpj) -on had earn- to
'
» _..-. ... J . i ^"p* P» 2
[ ] i Jj&t > • • • 5 '
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departmental relations, and cloea tute-^afense harstony *&* seen
«ta vital if we were t a*.~ ' fte/OI u,
, the fact that ~ouis joteMM a*4» for Ibe tfcet >-eur,
pre aided owar It sftde hie.
ftiacttlftvly ill- up that w*e
Corthoosi.' .
ree, and the su ... Lou of
;w at&te of preparednaaa Tor the _>eru deadly global peril,
the ' ration* » budget Mill) .*«nt
fear w&a not defeat la ant , &nd the saaaive
Fear**- oni>- iniUUHltlj tu^aumtod forcaa
for U«n«r»l thur. FM Adainiatr l :. ;,ted one be-
aten tal budget after HMUtfi ar .. r*»t a fell tlft£ It ,osaary
ainuta acrutiny of ,.&rt.cuiars, vot«d fci I it &e it
wau | .. d ana • -i«a ttMM l« 1»
the fidci weaor 3 at, »hioh IM -<rco<S down to
115,3 *41I1« 1 , new stood at _-5^ billion, and
rograsaed at £61 Mil iaa
all billi MH • ' --he
following report ;a, submitted at the
i'iacal year . , . ur.-iariaa- tit aoney
j eat&hliahoi ;"or
atren#th





all-in . relation taut f-
foatari 1 of inter-agency co .ion e a wax
afi'.ri, rtia. H war effort,
1
'
*S(illia a a the the defanee
and ;get» war . and the .t^te
. pp. M*- r
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grown Irora 10 divisions aa4 11 ragiae$. •
:;«tia« a&- lavalt I
«i —to & tOVQU <
se&tal . -.*
gr. ifcy ojC whic.. oat-worthy, the -.ray's
tar* personnel early 6 ,
to »l*aosjt l,t> , „ iavjr ox its* teraaaaal
, to a.bou k . ,
waj fraa . '>f
it- piers 212 aajrriar grouts to
ite air ara. -Arias I increased I
sen to »or*s than - ?- ,
and } air •!•§•• ores gy«« from 48 #rcu,





.»* raaraaaant prograa rwaohed beyon . ll own ailit^ry*
however, '.'he utuai defense As»r- ?graa was vastly expanc
particularly for aia to 1*1 M. Military coasmit-
aettta froe SATO raesbera w.sre urge4 f ani the united tat
in Europe was increased fjp» two to & I fiats the
p. i hope was to aovs beyond the "trip wire" g
ev«ntttf*lly iavalai ffMrt force I , . .U" , Later (
and if fieco. rasa against a Any assault.
It wan seen Um.1 . • be aasaa
p
li*h*4 without 1
contribution, so the early 195°« also saw I ho v«s of
the lriva<
ibaq v -ea
aention— the birt-. ^Imv weapons. I first
sent efforts* to explore the possibilities of th»i»e a**] in
109
'
• •• tt oi Defense, -eaiannual !; ,oi' .the




• i ':,.... " 1*4 , «iS









liaited war vegan in 104*1 *-*< waS 1 >4t
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California Inetituta ei jr. ' use gli&peea oi
oii»se. Nl &«en in the
the
, Iftftt .53, ac So
, waa I ?Ce r to #e«
the tli | oesed r&pid'i,?,
ine ktle aivel;/ to the
t f " o
to .itlofield" sit • HNrt




Fore n, a„j soil eg
.
penheise.
Mat, it -Bras never approved
I
rovei, however, a








/eara, w first W -..ivioe at









, -. I (.June, lj;>l) t 147.
':«a
-
r the «-u>u- urtune . .... il,
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awaaoea poser of , "ut th« I Ml








1, in r.urua, b -ievastat. -vat
troopa In the spria*; 1 >*,1, ruaultel in a fllMxtnt i« t&alv
raaalve tactlos« it aas readily a^pajrent to o«co» ~n c,
tfcat ct a^greauion • -urly as aoil M ciitS I ..
subtle MatbaAa - Haologigal p<m
,
political
M| ar;j, I *reaa, ftr I • .-enta I
.••rilla wfc., ,t»,
in March, 1 - t&ctiea was
erlan i trar. -^t, with hi-
c«ri tral Loo
wit- .a Koraa, i ate
I










i.r, ...j effort tered
abc.. ... .Jen li r §tff*t«jgy t . had yat evolve*, but




concentrate. i I'Ope, a ..XI <£« id neuvily on th
M», now I ^ 3Lytf*ti»v - at, Nit it di:; inciuAe
In th© i !.acii wurt *v®II on tn*ir Umi d«val<
Bon v . ry tafamat patta rin u tva jjcrtissetar,
and ^iiitarj a
technological aid.
atftiMMNit o ft haavily Mi fctM eiiita-ry
« al actruau
1'hr B illi i at, on th* othor Rand, - re tod
taHftt iiffasi , and i .. iaenhower took affaa>a a
»*rk*& atr&tagic anlft . , * mm
arotr,,i a central ., foe tight jr«*»»«




aft*r forld ar li— of the cu , th*
lost.
.
rifl ." . , and . .-.:,«* of
Karaav—th* :«|;iibiicH rallying I for







uOp cxiiaueWi.'* Y&e :.t Lftitforss in 1^52 *« r««
f«rtiter, .. - 1 , til.*, i
,
M Liiccwia.:* li ... p, ae a
w&e bltts&tt'j . ifelte J Pea, *u
lagic ieotril . i.tios
l
to a . lated curr«:
of , art fr
»t ......
, MMMiattfl cont&insettt and oooxiata




to notoriety , r-ut it tiiooa fit
in d#t policy. j.u&lly, to OOftflet
lur-is in
't **» ^''' Q io
ana .aant r&auction fcl -v r-
Iwi I -v 'urfta. ."aeeci wit:, Mm i








I I M Pi Mktftd :itiO" - to
a "
- , », --„ , a "jpaj bio&l
1
Johi t«i bi







offensive, ! * "great oruaade—-for frt exca, and f reedoa
in the 9Vi4« M it Mi *•! - uiatcd I ^ne of
, U
. . -ia&ge. oa*?ral












ciar, broke*) 1 • . .
•
.'iffoliii., • rtfe .raa,
,
. .
alavea. acMed fiv :r«d alaios people
Lie i jsaap^.w^'.-.
• • * •
•• MD est—and wf ra all
If world, -i-'slin--
i« war)
of freedom fcae riffit to choose their o»a ,...- I , I ei
t>- lelt&i
way of | eaeefu. eroanently with
:isaniaK in the worla.4
LB the canpai^n, vftar ce, hj , for
exasple, in his I aeaaat#e of ebrt , ', and
»* each »1 I I , , -dent
^wer c . ...... -;
con tu. i.-
,•
- ..»er t . , MNV ••', I .. .1 ied lib«: aa
an ttltiftat< ., t as a oouerwte pirns to be ; . r.
POM the a »i»t
m , at ... bwrlit.
,






\4. oven gpecinc^ A Mt sr&oi a aaries
6
Lj upri ii! ,*• i I
,
in
. r of .
,
t\y
apcfceataan, nnd *fe .,..., reOftiWtf no
r« (..uensive >rl fcl ®a v the ©hock
in waa i-nt that - Lniatra
allowed "rollback" I .
,
need,
cor;t.iin; fa Lfl t ./pae
t mimliti 1 . t crusaders" *er« completely
quenched -an
upriai f i$56« jUt M zhii iifcwrfttiaa pall .s»





B—allXMIt to Monoigi could eeil to r> A a a II
/sir of aj. Lai— te ind Ml
•lament ? I vari'..u,; living
dependant v riableg. : he first salvo nad been fired \ fctf
, , in a erotta
apeec^
,
i _od foi ic
w^apo: tjOtf cut in ..w.r -II r- ex runaituros,
I to&ieve " k&le eea%« a oyoaee only
t*o l-O
,




. .*.— .. » , . 157.
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• :. i let . , 1951
»
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siant and a balanced led. General isenhoeer eae
rfoct choice fey . , .or vat .l#e a« a
pet. urjr here, as tne conqueror of a, &uhind a
for K
,
pseatioa WW military wisdoa
of this eeaj •» lit . week
of D«r, ] terel Aaaaaove* placed himself squarely
in t'se "sweurity with do-ivancy" I
is ao tb<. a party aaatiae*. tat ttlaa himi
tis t a tough
cosmunlair, ana a acre feaet on , Mi • reaucti
.
tmditureu and I t .ie other, "ho rirooluti'
of these eeesingly mutually ©xclusivt* goals was to lead inexorably
to rsaaaive ret ea, and MM -*r capability
that Korea I y.
lBjaVetary tctlons
Ml of the first aott of was lift
our roaroA®ent effort - aitail* to the ! '". ill*
;.ch, or, mi it
,
to the ' a floating





inad by resident Eisenhower In all
rata of April 16, 1*55 • — " • : that the . • .
his .ed to "aaj aa#ic sal jri
thill > toned ou' of c production
ps«blt*t a M ../ *a.i on tl ...under thi 'i&t a
vary X-,- , ste t .. . it nay cor
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*ixis*t for fwtan to mt>"
This approach m.c -tie, but it ad
sell the
.
ealei*ft« jj&aed on the
11 Ion*, pull" plan, i« Joint . o»e up *;
!.rohmg reappraisal ftf defense needs, a "new look." At first
tie ^uoctajj, for fcka i - : - . ;ot of
eldeftt Tsiuuta BM already ec. ... reduced fro. jvioue
ones, and could not be cut MMMl further, nor levels.
Hit ffiMftl year Ifff bud^t, however, the new lotfe fetflftB to
take effect, emerged which continu. b**l the
d», bodgvtl rdicts," based not on
military needa but on politic^; Htaa of BfcM the economy cc
| :'orce levels were re-fucod ? in the
oelilac, at the tgsa to be felt, t - r*M
•:rted _ ic retnii&i.
.
ooae tir;;t.
.ven in • expan
ev.rry y—J% "' ; tendency s&a the skyrocketing
cost '.icate' I syotoasi, ..-;.. . .ri.
lo
,
// alrej . , c •
.
11
or the outs w .. ..
.
my, anu In spite i . det«x
Q
lis ftd - fast later i a. d fe i I, new
xotif and
I—JB* o.t the ne* : ( » a Ml
eterss' | *orn, v*^ ..... t..":
o#
» 1959 )» PP* 1*5
9
' HI uav.. .way. ~ aoi c I ft.
*«e , . •:, ;,.
10
ial security
3 iSiii M# 1958 1 P. 1T«
11
eveat7«eix percent of th- iscal year
; 1» ai , ".
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ef.orts of two succor ive r
,
lav, the i.-.ited war ,.





-it ftigttip&aata I i i ," , -ut also
Of str^ito/jy. l« , t#8 , •tratagf
aot -ttl«. ..'1 control resided la tat Bud*, I
iier's Offlaa in the M .fenaa.
within th- -nttd talliaf, ae of the alio
allateci each lierv
attract it wit' I or* weapons, tin& to orall
,„-,:«r l . . . .'.•-. bit latter idea w ct
outgrowth of t at the Eisenhower ^n'a
for- jy— aaaai** retaliation.
;.«t'iliation
fre polio tea iaoi
ha& -•-tea and critic.: , tJMHl
that ^i " i as well a^ aaa
of : , a cio3€ ta
ftf %&• itrf relation-
ship lc ' -ate, Tafl idea itaalf GMRl





...... ffee aj na J.
tlV* > - - :.;;;; 36
.,rK: S&Fpar and iiroi
, iffSJ, £>p. 127- V.;; and *aul 2.
. , ,r f ;- ;ai2i rs_v lo r . ;»jf -an^e: /'/he ,>.-..* eric-ftn „ -.^li titr. a rit
T
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of the Saruch * la. >4*>. he philO! aaauive ratalxnt,
was inherent in the air-ato*. •*
years , but had no t been . . Hit by
.
*lect: | if< uilea fc »
of aausiv© I
he i blMt the be;. ina a?-
eottia be the '. aa and the
.jov i .,.,-,' he askiiu t *' • tee
3? that if , for
Wljf into ^ we will ft#t be content serely to try ^o ft*#t
their arsed forces at tlu select i ajjgreeei
but bjr retaliatory ftatj . . tcmiagt" If . pointed
I feaat ria and hina, notably JtU, arc vulnerable
14
• . ." 4 fee days later he atat^ ««,
we la* ..late again© t open ag-^reeeiun by a i eea
powar to rtMt An ag, It nurta" by 'mil of MM c;
He laad par th» need for adv •••-no© warning, saying;
e only effective way tv» atop proa^ectiv© aggreaaorn x
convince feata ; Mi that Qftaait aggreaaiaa they will
be subjected to retaliatory bio*, ooetly that th«ir a#gr«8tiior.
15
will tot be a j,t, ;," J' • ;>eae atateaenta, taken
at ini - oe tmlaa, ran .r.
accept tfcaa as ft , *-ion.
13
'
» . • 3 •
15* Kew Yor& floral i tri e , **y ib t 1;*>2, :. :.
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, r. ;/ulles did not view tac* in thia ... I as a rejection
of %hc ; articular liaita imi .itary .action in kor«a I
en tAmknl - La Jistinction MM MVil1 really ::ade
,ce«ent« sere accepted by the public
as Nl altern^tivy to the then t*a of limited »ar.
General . ie&rthOK , MNFt •*« tn»n kia
prospect i cretary I • ft*at«4 the
latt«r
'
• to atosic re? .
L%] criticise! the Idea of exclusive raliaace on
iiatory air power.
,er the eleatioa vletafl , one tJ aanhower's
firut saves east to fulfill his campaign proei seking a personal
trip I . MPii rc-an
17
. virln^: his return tn u£e cruiser
•ja, key Keebern of the new eiaiaiatvatsM -.ihapea tne




strength si strength. It Ml here th xve
retaliation . tt shape and eaa agree. i aa a
keys tons of I allltftSy policy
.
.1 eleaent m
inserted into the foreula ft sal Han stressed that
United states poser I iBjllHiltlj I exposed posits
*orld shere ./ be .
.
Mi . . ...xberger** articx
**• ;^ il ifci wrk
.^ -Tibufte, , :. I*., •good a&al bi .-.** topic
Mil i -2uK,.
17g»w '/or ctober J cv, 1952, pp, 1, 8.
j a tow, Vhe
„?.*•,» ci.nps.
xli aad alii, for mo I tnio
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for our otriki' reserve siti.
.
*a©ri;;a and dv . to t, At
l« eawieaged tin * -ng
air and «»v , •> Bf s-eapone.
In this r**spect ho diif' red aarfcedly ft* , lor, I *o
reoateft tfaw i ile strategic I ^e,
but who w. vliMMM - -;h »® "-
and great fir«-po«»;r, co: atoaic.
t idea of dii**mgages*nt Appealed etron^iy to j»«r,
who saw - baoij t ;ar> posture that would permit
•igsiffiaeaft Aefeaai i,u;ig«6 r .one, ae *oil a& the an*w<
hie campaign pppfttil that any war fought with
20
"Asians a, iane M it. the front lines.
The broad strategy outline that emerged froa earlj.- Liaenhower*
ordered studies waa a continuation ntainaent, boletered with
net? atruto,;io ices at eeaJt spots (e.g., I >,
Lit aist), an<2 baCKstopped by a strong ry r0i2ar.ee
21
• ns—croun-j force operetio. bift**" to alii*
the rejection ru«aa I xa-
tra* *i lifflitatt o:, concept in Korea, one *•#'*




Qtt Charlee J. V, urj
,
.>* or . >;Ut, r feune .
(January, February, !*?«&, tprll, 1956) f P'l
kooat el atratt; xeenhower k -tr«.ti.
particular point tee
•12. ..- - il*i" account i >.«d
la Robert J. laaewmn,
.__.
-,;'.. .,;-. tj , - :
••-
•"•e ..t^
Harper j* . ^tberu, 195b), pp. 17-19*
York , i.-tober J, 1932, p. 16.
21
karphjr, fortune , areh 1996, p. 251.
22
:i^e. liey Eur* .;i
•ry % . 1, 14.
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nil, but because t ! /evident /ruausn*s first Ktffef
lirait, its reversal M IVMl infaower , ;;5 first act set the
tone fi t was to cose in the limited war field.
: ter the broad •***%*£? essentials were decided, there then
began the Military isaplaaent-utl- the nee look, declared by
6V |c tve "established the direction whic I ted
poli followed froa 1 the pMMNNM
[i ]
t:
' It was characterised by reduced burets, reduced
manpower, and t M conventional serpens, (wit
If bear all these cute)| ftJM I ianev on
nuclear «4 and strategic M „.sengagessent, H or
withdrawal I miMfta troop coaaAfUMMa, Ita key tneae .ie
"substitution of MMinlttM far nan," aade possible t arrival
of the •# MMUMUr . , ' is was expressed by the new
efensc, . ilson, Is Larch, I954i
. . .
the integration of MM weapons systeas
into military plan; Ml rel >m
.atari*! eh: i-ower
M overall economies in t • of Mmpower
• *
The fiMNel /ea-r 1955 budget jor&taa the
new forC' jeolives •• a rapid bviil
of air • th, and the erection, aintenance, and
full Hxploit&t- : modern «er ....
as we increase the striking power bat
forces b^ the &; Men of technoicf-, -os
M) we- *Ml by the c .uing growth of air-
ier, the |Oti 1 MUMMF if fclliwM Mlftl can
be reduced. ^4
The new look MM th liable outcose of the -tl
. .., , Senate, subcode it tee it tee on
-, 85d von/g. , 23 . «s^., 1954, Pi'. 3i 7, e, quoted .

126
aandate of the nepuelicans. m sacurity
for -e on the greatest threat,
and, as : • orean period, fcfea ability to i- ..iaited war
was a i^rificed in a rt fco ii^HWtflCI of & aajft*
?,tt*sian att<v.
eg «&& publicising t.- . -lie/
trtMb #f ajmlataaa I v- r
-r.a a#al4 result la MMltiWt §i
to : riea« ¥&••« were only pr«lic...
.-...
: ive r-.
was sad© aj ^a in hia adiresa before the . aiga
ta aa J* / 12, 1954* *r> ••Xaae
ar foraer policy
iaaao*er»Bailee altareativai
will always be iapojrtaat,
fcaaaM local defense which alone «ili cent
the .- ^t world, a***
defenses eaat . aataaaftafct
of aaealve - power ....
w say to -ieter t£$J aa
eoa unir.- 60 ea aiaiiag and able I ly
at places aad *: jxr.g #
. pta were
aaala




. raat and la* I
is n h -
••> I in





53 . »ri i^-.tfw !'oj "per end











, . ttuarj s
•
, 1954 1 ?P« *
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•pej by sea, by land, and by air; *ith ol4 eeapora
and •» ireapona .... - not bt
continue without #rave budgetary, econos&lc,
;>cial Ct :ie«18.
KM - '--ifi«d.,
the . qm t M the
;
, Mi .is&ke sos?e
as been dons. ?he b&eie







the Joi I t&ry
Ml ki lit -fhat ia , . teat
vl ko trj :o imm I nqr't
•.cea. ve of ft s«l ectior-
I I -. i IMBI,
&» a result, it ia now poasible to g«i, a/id ©hare,
re basic aeenri
is ad i'f a ator the efr'ect fcfefct
it
,
u#e ever/ Minor I *o
esc&l *te to i.-/ut »*r, t&ert it would leavo ua no choice but
crifcician, in
tut*;;, la of ijornar , '(x i
fabuloui: ypa: . corro-
,
-;larii'icc> ti ...-
I , 01 fct .«,
i . smm »orae
27
;:ded u
Careful aeaissa to inaic 1 1 , owever, t *aa not the
v , t" the
;nci-.iae; I .on,
it 3C0K3 to lie with obtusss, . r.ate,
political. red sjr i i»ag-r, -r^ doctrine








---tor , ioreab** 18, i 54 • -

1 ?
Corastmiata try another IflflMft »«s 9i I m
boaba on osoo? ... or elaa *© will I ioae of :;er
Korea. '" - r. >teve«eoa »**8 wrong and it. eeret
, fteftifft rct-tll&iian •.-. ;.'iexi; ll*jr a












aou >p "&t»a . ;«?," nor that we *
ihilete Mm I |
,
itee; r
i;» mmnq , tee
to '*:it tnssi [the &MMM ] ' •l40
for ft litsd &t**oa or ite vita interest- .
lies | j&tfiae 'e&pacit/ ' I
peered la al pronoun
t
fcOlfejr doea nnt
se the nee*? it in aftrj
i« to a general w^r.
Ha .^treaaed the selective 'he policy, de<. .









a., 1954» p* 50, -^b 1 x.* ,/ at taeoe ne&rlnga




Mo* t the CMUM of any
a^fcreseicn it .>scow
ln| or whatever it tnfejp be. i bffi alsout
&!'. ry
dependence upo Lity of aea . .
.
. )V
afgreee.; ich la & liti: .
. U« tC -'if. Jij . , •
and ii' fei potential aat
operate ve
deterrent. *'l
He later l*if&*4 the selectivity future - -- that
It neoeaes-rily -^involve ive destruction a£ great y
centers lik .ghai , Paking, or >»•" li« *ti o»
hoeevsr, »«*:• tl policy
pouid fee native i: ;.-o .s-.ntiai aggreeuora reaalaed
oneeidedneae" criticl;.
venson, iaivaj -.ated*
L**a not subscribe to th# th
at th; deliver -:assivo ato*it V on
Bate, fco na#t all our security needs,
not correct I n one weapon,
or ono service- , or that *«* are an one kind
, war, 54





alios .v^rt^i ar," ~ite t January
iee"
lira ,
>• | (April, , ... d "it is
I the and I
varioa.. »** a?;. <s,* '.ha need to have "^e&ne
effectively en a a*: /« basis," an-i for tl
Unite, t to "out It Ml th«^ only
one a 9pm





uivocatua of II . licy, who '
earrie . ta, far ba.y Ita
or: r. . ao, M ;*y
lee clearly did, liation in the all-out
*exji saneel«/ea in in* nuclear , ce
sldent aiohari . iicor, varitur* ape<"
,
-i» atatea: "
• u*» to death all over the aori I Ittle ware
we wou: futur* primarily on our tsaueive sobile
retaliatory power whioh w© c use in ration against th<a
roe as ion at tiwea a^ uoea that we oho*
?h<* policy likewise <todly suffered frose its clean aeeociati
in -:any alada, with tee »ttor dootrine of all-out uir-ato&ic
§%**%•§*— ft .- irogen a#® extension of die earlier i '—which
waa contain-; > . oyar^ an toy . poeiJ
-ntrovorr,
.
Several points as ae aade concerning the str of
massive t«%allatj examination of its
lioations. fftg a civilian strategy, in the ae»at<
it waa derived , tan (fiscal) consider t» and was shaped
raariiy by civilian e&alnis trators. vice t t
but primarily fro* these who would agree, as is testified to by
viets
..ecrctu: Ilea 1 uaaaLv* \
epeec.'..









it »• t «so mu ef flirtatl
. re
saoaiv- -iia&ion I
:,ratagy vaa not a
co&>iet*j rejection
,
a char. I -\%
aaaeaat. It wi| , <sad
at; l«terr©nc« fail* n of aaaaive r ;n
wouu, la all proaa
,
Ut«r*a*) tna £«OH;raphie
X | i ' . ild




varay uv.. , aaci
uni\>rtun«it« • mm* wAasatan&ing of
^er's.* can b aesi
if MMaaVt : leu in two ij.nsj—one, I




a."' It MM lc a< ty
a iiai . - i ted /-. :ce










__, , io-21, KMMMttl la*
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of this* policy ftfti a fan! . ... It *aa patterned
to atop iirec«, W§
,
uo
8«oh In Ljr onploy* it th« atwre > aoua
f+8 to ehieb sorcuniatii h. I, I ; no, it M
hav«* b,ea such an unpropitioua strate&y *©r« it not for still
MmH —the budget.
t* prissa i naaaivc M II i , the factor
ponaible for I , *a© th« tPtMiijf •«•
.; and as the at <ae iuj ...... It was this*




flexibility of oar ail.. . INUI it not &e«: .or this
fiscally enforced »»•>»»lAtiaiH t a*as.3ive retaliation or iV<»lf
*o«ld ;:ot baWi been e© extreme, but ay© resembled the policy
*hich Genera MP ha:$ endorsed. HuKH I the
nee look, whonev-u- -table clashes arose between
.it aias of pconosv and security, decisions were aad»
for economy.
4 final | a cept of "flsxifcill ... ,
; ov«r w led Utmmti ry^ortiona.
f iti .:gy at- . ;, a
fie?. , sense that it not condemn U3 I
the en< .*r»a bvt wouli psrnit ua to ohuose thts tiae, £laoa>,
senna of warfare. ?h« critics, imtftr , li kttsfta amssirs
(,or t assure r< I «}
infloxiii*:, \aomim\ ua to annihilation or inaction.
In tbair thi'.-.. , lity eat* eharact*
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available, hi .bile, i i .<iaed .. . troops in
I , equipped for .uiner c.ynv nuclear war, with
extensive aea-iift an.* air-lift capability Mi il
: tacr,i«^l air support. :a, they believed, could »e
choo.u- ivanta^oous response fr-ais the e< te apectr
available. In or - should be
realiaai th Last ( m critics* rtflaxibiiit.y" ia
aeraly a mars •-• • . I iaxiaility."
Jhe former veale* aatto pass all the latter, ani a. i capability
for local jftaai force action. Eg suaaary , tb*m, tftc key elea. '-
/taavc retaliation eat? i ts relection of t: ty of
ground
,
force action. antral Vaylori
Aray forces vo . I saall lest ee be tesp.
to use t al
weans. ^rtieane tf the .©* LooK stars c ;«d
at Mm ... ver ftfftia aaafce that asiatake
and set about r ;s to sake it
pr: llji li
.
our future I 1-9
sight ba so inclined. 4-<
It way this one factor which uooaed nasaive retaliation to
iapotence in the face of cleverly G vod coasunist aggression.
o-nJochina
* Military
strategy 01 .va retaliation ai . was tented in -a.
iiuri.. -^noa'a pea tsar struggles to maintain latus
^^uo x - . loan ecoaeaic ait, . ai:oi- , Mat
litary cquipoent sure granted to the trench fc; vaeee in
59
"iee, e.g., Osnoral »ylor*s proposed "Strategy of Flexible
Response." ¥he Uncertain fret, ^.a^ia .





cities, . ^3tiee rea,
©ConoKlo and technical AfriStttMM to ludochi.-. , . si *iad to
accomplish I • erss cm-jtainr.-«nt t flag the atu .. li of living
and devei |1 iible economies, had to bs subordinated &or© M
acre to ffiii, t:.«r,y klnst the
42
Vlctrsinh insurgentu.
As the coJEsuniat successes counted in if31 > i urred
by the inability of France* a unenlightened to
fcMVfcet MUMi loc^i «u; ...ort , tfttf I sr*iistic«i in /ore* *h.
freed whiae^e ssen and equii-cent for use
,
the drslnis-
traiion, mindful of the consequences of having failed to r;ive clear
notice of Aseric^V - . Hal to resist ag^red *ion in ?.oroa,
©sharked on a series of clear and . arable ware.
China. J Is the spring oi" 1954 the crisis rapidly e*a« to a he* ,
Terence in February lit 1| t 1 mX
ciis,. nril, ettle the tmii
I ch tfel Viatrainh, *JM enaiv - ,
41Cuur tct^riat: eneral kac vrthur aa v, t,he death warrant
for a.::;china." ,!at,t!C, . ' .
42
rl v 1953 -tea ;t«een
.r:len «ar. lists
year 1954 al v. 21 r .
4^
es of ; significant *ere the Joi , ,~ :-...
tflBI ie « - : *cjt*nha«ar , i; ad; jf
ast 4,1, Ln ehit. :» loss ol na
"eouli be oi -uance to the United tateej"
ana uile-s' ...-.reus of aj-tessber 1
, 19! .
'- Bttfilttt it such a seco
[ first] c ive
Yotk :'!«•» I the foil its in each oa*. „
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and advics, counted a !;eavy *6»*a.ult which B til
of ftlonbienpha .ne collapse oi ,;«a
ay. I fftMSf .
in July, 0A4 the - ! fia-i «nieA
In spite oi our I
threat- t -/ «*«•'"• a oi' total i
while a wit -the**£c .o cos
rjiouai do
worii uk an eapty bluff
.
locfe. ol . \nia
huonii . a aarke- , , -tateo
I ear a irately, a-.. . ; with
1
1
The non-i:H-:irv«ntion deci sion.
.. . fche one hand, the area mm ^rued <»s« vil
•• &OOUX'.:
IftlltlOJ &0




declared, throe degra hu t
. oo xn w«*x j;reso declared
it. " He likeliho^. 9 be alia, for ev
44
, .ltod «8f , -26, . ?a a» a general







._, arch 11, 1954 • ?• 1-

1 f$
jenate aajority Leader Know land, an outspoken advooata '
r poll , iven "'categorical M . ;ce»" ted
proc«8:-!e.- ;ied tttalr c, . tion at the fttgM '--'•*» 14
gratia factor I nmg the mlw M favor of inacti
and revealed the #larin tB4HMI of :aa«siiv« ret . >n.
rll Ifea ft nasperat
appealed for air strikes to save Pienbieaphu. Two fc—rlcaa aircraft
r» were close by in the south Cnina ea ( i ir
groupe areed with ataaio wen^na poised .., ... were
nevor ueed, ' ihy—.eh en thia proposed ssove aeahed aa closely
with Ike nee tff /—was it D«i taken'; >n» of tne con tr I but:
reason a was undoubtedly the fuct that thu lian l
•-, ae in Korea, fteair assistance was so all-encor.pa^L'.. . ,
how*<v*?r, that Uiia a I be given tot*i I .. I saaoad, and
• persuasive, reason was the lack of British support, secretary
lea attributed a Hied
failure in iah disapproval of l*or united
actio.. aeat ion behinJ the decision, fcitavt
asanas to be its military weakness. . atoaio air strikes
were Brfad by >ocret
Email, an -al leai<:re vita van
iir&ua, faeir objastic >>& on lac the
J sere tar alias* fallttr* M«
and a* -i air strikes »ou without
quoted by ja*e« ilea ton, ibi.; . « February 12, 1954, a,
47





ewentuui ground troop c sent. .itod the
eost affective opposition to intervor. saw, la the
strike proposal,
. . .
that »*»e Old drrlua. m . . . that we co.
,
.to
Indo-China nit and navul forces alone .... I
, if e« c Lttf ."id naval power
to that area, have to iollow fchea u^ i- ;-
sedlately •*%! nd force® in support.
• • *
In , tb&t air a: •-!
poser alone oaumot wis a MM that te
gr one either. It wae incredible
that we it#a that bit tar leason
soon— that wo *sre on the verge of »afciM, that *<&$«
tragic error. 49
I underscore Idle , igway had a teas of
expert?* taffVffj -.errai;. ie facilities in lr:iochina,
and b« £qtv>. , >*in# the jolty of
military operations there, MM) the gigantic ^cope to which they
would expand, to the /resident. It La the uener»l*t .at
I "pi&yed it < pa a daciei- , »rt in
persuading our
.; ov«rncn<nt not t, .rk on that tragic *a
•.f ter the -i.
^pril 4, 1994
»
-*«r I four c '-.a,
.jrissation, that \&v* to I
before the Baited terrene feill taniy. \ %





. ta'i excellent account of the ladoehisa
crisis liste tnio s 1 otor in tfet
• . arden City,





tiVMNM invite us to aeuist her. , Mi euat tktgtrmt to
see it tferoe . . the stigaa of
iOlftill! by guaru, I ^lete I •a4*M4 i'or Laos,
Bbodia, »J -'Uhs,-' lea*l« not
he stet, our in-AO'.-ior. nm. M*ttV«A«
^trateffy iaEHoationa of ftun-iatei
.. a i iotor. -xylite-.
,
» and bImi . , j«i
of trie t- , - o lessen t. if *e had
l*%erv<.mo>"j ... itt*t« , which
vrds llski » a«ai . 1«,
rea. »o looked line a tvalftlag exercise -
-~aon, I 1 : . :"orc«,
vio.'is* ideal for % re and nearly
ittpoaaibl© for . urs , ttA, ftoft U-. . I bl* to attain our limited
objective eillti




: ... I fcVttrttU^ii,/ ttttf«
wou Itted.
, ,
wou vis bee. a.
it .no ..ly BSf :'or
Lted *ar atr . . c
t
#rey area:,. his strategy otal M to ree
'.: the abilit
I
jrill bitanta I ••self






be fought, Mi fought auoeeaafully, »t aocial (M i«
level. a#al to loc -ted *ar
atrat»ti/ for the rialaods . aaia MM .^y«
ke4 X*t Im guns
start ah . la & ftr-. | i«|
guerrilla aarfare *>, «««n aa MMy< 1»1 t; -ion
ox BUM conv^.'iti. , ut M> an alternative | -
•eo .ctice »f t>i . a bat t -lion or re$laent of I ' ry
IM „ ; u."4gle in riue-
.on again ooerranist agression had probei a ur
atratet.y, an; it w*ia I laoonc . >
n«w . avoid juat ti:i8. v ->«
; china in iiract
,
Korea, aaaaivv* iiation sight have I a
. .
•MMMAitfttioaa networks. -once of irect notion,
ho* iatory et*t ina aeaated too i-rovocative,
too likely to precipitate general war.
; critic... • -t»fer ceasa If
tha 1c .ha or this strategy. In twa
cies. o ara ..-*&» wron,.- with
>(Uf » a^'^ it r *




la a peeaage ah Mm
architect of this ^olic \X h&v© foreseen thy Utility of juet
. laaco. lelaiainj ana "aaglo iorsaula t'us.t inaurea
HI fori ue^eaa," he warned: 'it it
that at aost at ao«e , ;y ce aetoacka to
;•« iii t ; at tiny






careful examination of the r**cts one .. i*«* that it was not
ponsible for the loss of Indo*&lft*« : et
. to t*s point 't hav . . .;, rv.-..yd,
|#, while we asobillsed ictory; ;>ut I** nation*! effort
re»vt uiraa to U .vo been tracsundoua, probably m an the jiublic
•M re b«ea wi have won in nloehina would
have requirad lisitect *«ir pl^ , and acw . . t*fc to
if49 an. oarlier, 1*1 L**W« t** I itrat: ,.urt«d
shaping .lie/, ftj 1 f>4 it sets* unlikely that any Halt
effort t- t could *! so .led.
foeauita of failure in ..ui.^caina
it Mflrtlffi of , | the pot -sive
retail Bt of the new loo* becaxo twin
whipping boys for over, chappy with ths »*w*l%«« wrt
thy, the .wise political aatorian, captures the
•>d well.
/*?r •** Um •*%»••» the verbal intransi-
gence and the practical prudence of tuo nee ..ican
uvarieh week a,
j re **x>
*lt«rnatud wi .. .noes to the electorate that
i#e
in "another . IT*J Li the ao-called
'*%*£? of
,
- that lane eotaproraise
between UM Uflt M*4 r^ he spirit if
budgetary •eeaoay, eon . .-uonstrate its
1*4 rt»aie, the
local it*
the aaii^- i i elltil «ed
to the sole devic ocalyptic war on
ever/ ocoa . •-., lerroi cn;ric»*i allies
proteges without aki
enemies, and finally I L***tioa«M
"aid***/, p. 277.
*4
•'Herbert Lueth^ gainst Lf
,
m for- . , 1955) » v«
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ilo tail ia overly severe, there is no doubt tnat by
givi to th« ... Mil Ml . ^rad
to I ;>ata, »e fluff erei a serious loaa aJ IM«
. tat r the c .f our
deterrent. ?hia i&t I ba fully aj.pr«ciatod Ml) HMNH
one realise® tha extent to which - ©crota, ilea* strategy relied
orj thr&at, M . MHI our "declaratory
policy" M r "Miles ;;
I large, ! MPy. *eakn«- -de
M tirae aa it pmla#6 l"ear« of MB irresponsible use of atomic
weapons, - tftlM increased the lUNHMl el forxarly
countries toward the "neutr ' that duaeia had been
56
enc *itn - oreu . Thie tendency
eae further accelerated by the riae of I .once"
Voisojdiy in oacow aftei
,
the effaete ji" the
-*nce in I 00 the i countri.
by felM lin'a siajor policy snift, to a denial of I
inevitability of *--r, at '. li+th ftairtj ;aco»
in 15«4,




of follo*in«; the *lou||a line m foreign policy .Thilo regaining




to. la ..^ i . -. t~igaa^
ri
;oi
., . *-, develops taia idea fro® the an «d
in ,
,
. ~cy ," rj t





1 in i ; • .
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almost certain I have saved the day, nevertheleea the lose of
i art»a taught an t los^on »y la
baslftt need for strong forces, and expoead, painfully
for
, the tru we have the will ar to
.1 lei- -xaite-
I ,
. t our as fcCj acti
MM spot, an ft4vttjr%ls«d uxr-atoiaic oapabilit/ will not cont
niea,
M ! '-' trntwffy in the ' i-l-l^yS
In the years between the partition china in 1954 and*
• asi&ft launching of ...utriik in 1957, the Iisit#d war strategy
ox Vne United -it- I follow any cle.j.r pattern. sveral
eeesir.gly dissociated trends cnn be (-fliapsea, but even these are not
always consistent, fit* ov«r;.. lift te clearly in the tin
.ability, and IMM nt
of a iiaitsd war strntf- , ut it, If neither a ra^id nor a .
,-i it ioaa * r fro . the massive ret ..on
thrt :; pee truss.
Leotive
(t nft ohir.a, there bccnse noticeable en
irent "eeftenia ' cm
a»a»oiV'.? r . vc" m
a policy, which had always been ther<-i, nore now, for first
tiffie, stressed. In • :.*v«r»t
... . . ?tin& had
vtapoa 1 . Ll«a .as
«7
-e. ••«. , -ilea, -'ftirs. . . • , . 5,
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the point, it sa^ to riia to r;vi»* his
' hat I
nl%*4 . greater emphasis upon a
for "selectiv&" retaliation. tat
. I - MUM to lit retaliation to
a. 5s
action to i.
'•e>;.y» at *1 ya*ffa«
eclaratory policy of i; .lly a tar ted
shifting to one of
< I ..ice (although it was not
59labeled) isaaediately after ~ndocnina.
Tiie ii ..y be seen in an adorer U&f
i on .eo©sr.t;er S, ] which he stated t
:tv© develop©.;, with our alll< , a collective
sytstesa f power w>;ich MM be flexibly used on
whatever •#*!# Ml] its: Ml sake a*, i Lea
costly, ur capacity to retaliate MMI be, and is,
.;sive la st4«? to all lawa ol acgraaaiww
it if at fcuwa to uaa that aapaaltjTg aaafc.aa© would
be selective and adapted to the occasion.
Contributing to this gravitation away froa ©aeaive retaliation
was the continuing development of tactical nuclear weapons, discussed
at length below, #hieh had a poeeri'ul efiect la afeSBAa itary
sti aai t«iCtios»
.a AdBi 'a alt. . va to the weakens jsive
retaliation was clearly not to be a return to local .iefense, however.
lures aad aaanlan levels continue^ as
55
'"Hoacos .i obientii, Duel at tho br ijikt










ona a;, fc«aeat hglation^ ,
chap, i, for a ltu teaaaiaa of Ihls paint*
Later published asi Jalw .ilea, "x'he baa* of
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dlsenga«#a«nt wa« »ore full/ Xmw&mmM > !*• of strong
pftotOfttt by the new ./ior. If 1 (.)*>6
all but NM Uteri* ..visions . .rawn 1. orea.
Tar; enavyoziia .'".a. TO or,,.. ktioa, uilee
Stated w« w»re not dedicating any pajor I area units to
iioutoeat* t A»ia.
»• rely priaariiy u^un the deterrent of our r?obile
power .... I belie";'
be an open arised ax tack in that area the saoat
-iv« dtc'i wv <trike at the eourc« of
aggression rather than tr .uencan manpower
a area to try to fif;ftt a war.°*
fhe blow that these I itruok M Mm t&VMfttal
of "clauslcnl" Halted MUF MM a^ruvated OfeOB the ecio of
StatO outlined hia "ThJTOw fjroftw" doctrine in ; ebruary and h,
62
1955» y» the I ore , riOMii IM
oouthe - I j be C MPdopOadOBt , with
an attack in any one aret= runlet i««« being the
I for - in all three, it vt - . ieveo.
aspect of a three-front war would deter an. e afgroaeion,
a idea had evolved fvoa the or. LaOttOO&oita on
:rna i, ,* and !%• revival now illustrate* wall the
.t of fcrataglc
ot between sosaive r and local 1. op,
raft** onate, Povoii ft,
2d i«»u. , 2 ~. 17.
62
*
••fc'.p . owta;. "xjbru&ry , , , ^j
March .-,
, p. 4| ana .arch lb," 1 J , , . .
t
%
onovttn, pp. ll c -16.
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i'ublio jpraaauro for a limited »ur capability
l laasona of Korea and Indochina w t lout on a
considerable segaertt of the ftttomtlw public, howev , as
the asonthe went by with no tlgltifj I taken by the
.atrution to fill the limited war , ;U3 of voices,
wb^ of much *«re highly vocal and articulate, rose in protest.
In trie forefront waa »»<?org« . , clais
total wara MM paseed . . . frore now on limited ;iii tary operations*
are the only ones that conceivably aarve any cohor
purpose. 4* Close in hia wake eaa« a of
booka and article;* b writers &s> e and Liddell Hart,
attacking iatration's stratftfie concep , rf e,
^tical figures of the Jeaocratic party joined tne fray, i lea
are kson*. A a poaition of ir. John
Poat^r . allc* » « « JUt • .li.y a ^ro^are-for-orie-type-of-war
policyi" 3 and ex- Is* . : tary »*a charge that: **»• do not have,
nor doeo the adrainlstr tion iatftfta1 , the groun-J forces
. . .
adequate to :ieal with lissitn as, should th*y become
M
necessary.**
:aoure toward the li MaV concept alao arose frota
(si
the gener .biic realisation that the ''balance of terror'*
64
orgs F. . isaiiti< ..can Fort-l^n i^liey
(xrincet: alvereity Prasa, 1954) • >• 00.





-:<;pteatber 27» 1 ';•>«, p. 14 • flw a .ore
complete discussion el oheaoo'a strategy ideas, i ^d




. aty roas, 19*58).
67
coinerj :hill in of
. , reaa of .:arch 1, 19*35*
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reached since the dnvelo.pt-.ent of thermonuclear weapons had rendered
all-out war too terrible to contwaplate.
react! , t vague awart;nesa taat tale new force
was iv eat another weapon" : aat ef Ml suicide
for t;, .«. it is a carious fact that . .; horror
wrought at -riroshisa and Magaaaki resulted la no such reaction.
teas ion-type weapons wer . . . . a power to stake
then seea to belong to the eaee oontinuue a.; conventional weapons,
alto at the extreme end. . erhaps the older delivery systeaa
etill left the hope of liaaal jtection intact, ta iaj case, as
tedt "serious thinking about limited war to await
the eeaiag of the thermonuclear liitl .... no one ... serious
advocated explora' ited war techniques prior to tho coei
68
of the H-bomb." >e, coupled with the Lie freshets
limited ea* th. , was a deepaeated revulsion against the eaavtat
fusion-be.- Pasafl?« I te«eve*i although President Eisenhower
hiaself, and spokesaen for his Adalnistr&tion, r roclaiaed
that thermonuclear war was no longer a possible toliej for rational
aen, they maintained thai the surest way to avoid aar vas to stand
fira in our to d: jur values aad interests, if need
be by life itaelf, aud that the best . ;ork for this nau saasive
liatic .
The nr for Ix^itea war
Bat the eleaeat oi lie opinion was u
alone. '" is two years aa e*a\J ' , -r.eral
Faaj - ly rec a truly effective
68
liernard Srodie, M ore about Limited ar, r . criJ /ciuica.
,
le. 1 ( ctober, 3 , 11J.
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limited war capability—"com bat-ready forcau that coal;! . . .
cut big fires or little ones wherever the Comaonlete raight s«t
b." * Mm urged the development of both atoaic mventional
capabilities, ani po. out that contrary to . ry
m was maintaining, field araies in the atomic age would
ro.[uire -.j »re aen than previously, Mis efforts did not prevail,
however, and h# felt that in his two yeara as Chief of otaff he
"araa being called upon I .r down, rathM :ild up, the
ulti»ately decisive element it: a properly proportioned lighting
force M iaitfe tha world couii Mat its hopeii for Maintaining the
peace, or, if the catastrophe of war case, toy -roing ito will
upon those who broke that s*aaa«" ,;peatedl> he "was ca:
to take actions and advocate policies, whioh, II continue -ht
eventually so weaken the united states amy that it could rso
Ifgil . . • fulfill its role as an effective instrument of
7o
national policy alongside of its sister services."
In his last days as Caaaf of ItAff, uener.il iigway submitted
a report to ecretnry <ilson containing nil vie .local
71
security. He stated therein, in the strongest terms, that the
<ites smat "be pr^parod to n$e_t aa4 a cm' cat Halted aggression
iu aaail pat ta?a« whether or not sjaaltaa weapons are used."
ffhia
.
capabilit y, in .h ia opinion
.
i
should take priority oyer the
capability to d efeat
.
the ' .-ovist Bloc i n rtenural ear. He further
flatly stated Must our present forces were inadequate, a "it on
69
...agwaj, j.. g|J fl
... pp. 193-
71
he report is • iced a Lix 1 of his book, ^ee
^,bid. t »». 523-3*.

u
to develop what waa needea to produce a "viable ailltary atr'itegy
tar situ * la Its entirety, thia paper wao one of
th : j nal St B,
accounting adequately for ii war, yo>. . .;ced.
paper was filed without act , owever, aaa* |aaa**s
igway'a differences with the Adair. n were partially
responsible for hia replacement . ,-lor i.
alt la four veara were filled, aitfc r&ny of the sane frustrations
hia predeceaaor experience . , -neral aylo: as a alow but
aiflaaat change la national ana military atmftag) . I terly
fought tfaahington buttles are well aessoribed, thou Laaed
viewpoint, in • . .. .: Uncertain yru^-ot,
r becaxe Cltiaf af -', the
iiutional Saaawitf Council had completed ita 1955 review of the
new look, ani me r Li tl .ecuraov f* paper
r< presented luaa a departure, . Lest, f.j
ttaaaive retaliation that he develoje.t
T2
to implement the policy aa he saw it. ' Be thia Mth« first
coherent a to new etr^te^y of Flexible ite^pocae wMich
waa taking fava to oppooe the orthodox atratt ve
Retaliation," and it forced the core of the position he argued for
and dafei ..-it ire tour,
'
J
.-it alia heart of thia














If «r« act in comjii$t«nc« #i L« of
•ItOtt] or




ve ctor;/ in ^qnor.&i aar . "f4
This* m alasu? . ->trov«ray, whic ,
aae controversies, la . !i*n
to the alloc LB, which
were ntfvar , b® used to ^rovide a -moral
wax* iiity, or




In ..aneral -ay 1 a buttles, and in uanerai aylor' a aarly
one.;,
• really found its*] of one at the
iefe* »#« tinge, ax Pi ont o;
-vices. .. -.v ,
cose aroui
During hi* four-/*? i . , - - several
act. . tfeo fcvtsj- fcla»4 . the probl*
ih« M i ;,o, inc.
,
-.ly.





firo brigade. 1% wm
, ,
• r urce. k eeco . t©
74.
75 ia. , .
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»a« the s I* t y structure
"triangular" divisions e i7 t5*& ^«n *& n«* iC "
I about l z ,': I ;, »i t
logistic responsibilities -oved to the r&ar ech&Ione M live
•sailer co^but BBiti t .*» division .; a ployed
76
for elfhei atomic or oonvei -.1 warfare.
.•ilatratloo*^ r .- jj stance
u
io ,1,1^1 ted .^ar
If, in rotroapact, it Rialstratloa**
nat.. -dually shifted ill Ife I -.. i froa
raa
»
retaliation t,o a greata* I eca of that net;- Halted
war - MM eaarssly apparent at ike t^ nd
o.fi. bNMMI to anj • on i-:av.4jive re ,ion u
strong, 'he f» if aot
,
tratad
by the foil , I January, 1959 1 * 4<i declared
that ' 9X9* M I .ii' biter of tUUMM ty
you didft't »;no* el . . f , 'if
-t deeper and deeper, t aa jaet ao I was
77laposed b >J ferae itself*" adgot
»»&&« of two Ml later, - war stated thai the
)ti aosJ ..rcej "it t. tain rea. -lear-
air- forces to Iti 43 .al






., 19-57 » p. 144, h V- . fc , '*-)-1^ . See also "
tha ;l@f atoaie .rnsy/' qnited..i>tate t and aor port , ry




. 15 » i.*V'» p. 14.
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reaaor i'roa initiating an at . '
'
vin burden of the
defense of jsaariivo rfttallatlea, owever, I epotce^nen
for the Oefenae Msftrtatftfl , an effort well documented in General
/lor* a book. Under the lead; >•€ • Pf lilf« and
Adwiral iiadford, every a J . was cade " :. UkX str
79
eve concrete pat". etaliation." '
ttany of the efforts involved the definition of typeu of war
and a riaation of the a with which they would be fo
I '«a^ determined to eliminate froiB ailitary claiming
any eeasi4( f the possibility Bf conventi with
the >oviet
,
to a large decree he auoceedeJ. jo
forc>.:i through a decision -rising the arraed forces I at
on tl of atoaic a—foal even in "situations .,hort of general
war, when required by Rill* ry con^ider^tiona. la offact, the.
actions* mil of a ftdttVBJttlOMl c at of
sort with the ttj :1L at:d ee^Kened the Mil Tor c, Llw araaed
80forcee in limited wars." - reason for this lack of fit ;ty
in ftXwftalAg, which Bight wwll nave proved uroua if tftsttd, w«un
the bti : fiac which lay at the foundation
of all defences policy.
aive . it the







. t Janwu 57 1 »




lad a ^ajor effort to cut conventional force*
urtiet&larlj -' . . '..rociucei late the.
I the aoat draatie proposal of the New Look peri
which If led, --
revl. re* force structure in the next four
yd •„
, the rd
proposal is of historic significance ft* «ui it ion
0>f tit* tXtettt to tai • aaalV*
.ation aaia prep&rea to go ....
l*f fch or I proposal . . . the
deployments . . . »sre to be reduced to srsali atomic
rft** a ..(distance to ^k
would be left to token I. 3. force;;, implemented by
th i i'crctjs ...... ...
waa la reatl* reduced ana Unite *rily to
civil ....
iho propoeal was ba^ed upon tne a ad
acceptance of ti rt-«ar t&OOfJ*"*
aftOT 1 .'aylor to t^ie
plan, c to ifca poajr, at hoae aa
abri. ;at ;i t eat drO] • '. It r t* later tiy
les s I for
- on la y to
"Eaxirdise air power .niiaiae the . r," an: »as
,
aria ' rcy traagta iown to d\
,
mm




and its isaesiv sa, ie well euaat .nt
attributed t. rjf ilaoo .. I ord
to fi ra« fa aaa Oftiji afford la l<f *ar, ai
there i^ oaa that i will u«»."
81
'
Ik--!- » • ; -4^. laa alaa «»'ew iar :jimt July n, 1.;, is,
and 17, 1956 « till p. 1, for the aaaaatioaal "Leviero leak" aud the
follow-up stories on the proposal.
j





'incil, which showed an ftwft I of limited war problem:-;, was
overriden L .. o of 3 1>57, which followed the- SJtftoivO
i
retaliation line closely. ^
vary effort was aai«, not onlj in the .*rt'sc
but in the .•.tut throughout ffoshiogtofl to - e«p the
hitter 3tru
;
f/;is saonj th~- Joint chiefs of Staff fvoa publicly
known. It sees* to have bean a clearly defined po&J f the
.laanhcwer Msiaiotl to hide such disagreement?, on the theory
that if t lio »«re awiiro of the top-level
,
of
the true facts of the saiftiSfll international poorer balance, the
for a higher level of defense expenditures *ouid be
85
severe, typical of the adalnistratloa's policy was thv *al
of publication clearance for an article b; .1 ylor. >rit
for ypreii-.n ..ffairf,; Lao< tho article, entitled "Soettrity
throu rrenco," cast doubts upon the credibility of Mb ive
retaliation and ur flexible -ilitar
ite and Jefens* on the returned article &r« rsost
illuminating of Mm faithiuiness with which tne^e .ions




r.cort.iin jt, f . 47-
85
t thorough dioouaaion of this point, ••«
|fce United dtat aa in the orld <>rana
. pp. 516-19, and ilils,





-ho draft artioli , tlta : -rtiseiital eoaueent. , Is . ,ced











'i'ftoir® c:ui 00 little doubt that the adherence to a policy of
nsaastive r • tion by >iatration w*3 dietatad alssoat solely
by the to;;— level view that a sound economy ar; ilanced budget
were 01 paramount xspov
Rilittiiry answer la '. . . iaaaiv iiati..>n *aa born of
a spirit of retrenchment , a«i -.. MM eoi; -acred iex
ailltary Hirttwrrt" mittil In . « -io torn****, nuclear device*
of all tvpoa—-roae aharply, the *4httl tion eat forced to an
ever greater iepenieactj on this policy. In implementation of
aidont .^iaenhower'a fira cob it- a*t to hoi. . £,he iin«
defense spondin,, , el ease in equipment coata, inolu.^in* the
huga and completely unprecedented »iaail* research, d ;ont,
. , to be oi'faet aorewhere, I r»lly by a
reduction in force levels, with the &r»y bearing the brunt of
cut— ..;..;>;? wipBtif laMai Lfl fcara, roinforced the need for a
str I 4 . la*t dapaad on aanpower-- thua generating a tendency
to boost rsauaive NU1 I a notch hi r:her each year at the
expense of Halted war. atary ahoe pinchea t r,
the prs-Korea picture repeal ..elf, ana the intar-aervice
controversies rose to a fever pitch. . .. blWM&i was convinced
that its own aim >cti*ine represented
an eternal truth, an , .troi of MM wuapone
necessary to .t-;stroy fcfc Ufc&t threaten©. , iless
07
of duplication. A oinor crisis waa rauched in Ihe yalngtc ;
airpowor ;oarin&s of i ;f:-, which generated alaost a< . heat
87
,
io 1 car weapons an n Policy. . r>5-59»
an excallent, well- sion of t .. it.
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and BAOk«, and almost a3 little light, &s the ii-56 hearings of
1949. father '.. Mi .1 I
,
thij iavti iloa «c . I aassiv*.- tlon
p*j , ami oonelud for air power
sere needei to lajt&i
P&ltoMHI of plan; :>fenae aroun retard
tut-1, a rather arbitrary total derived primarily f .iitical
considerations, was lit xn these jtMUTCm A good ,9 can
be seen in 19>6t *«tfi#€Mi had cone u b a
budget estimate of 149*9 biliio? :'iMttl year ecretary
s'ilson rejected it L v ot»t n
"unc ul» burden on ifl taxpayer and w*ts completely
out oi raogv .." ' It wa iM country c
"stand*1 no acre than ft] 36 billi ase, ao the cuts
wuro &ad@ which urove us further froa a strong lira! tad war
capability. A alight respite occurred m Uui fall of 1956, *hen
the clues crisis a . uprisings in 7 stirrs»i up the
intt*r situation, but soon the bud^et-deterained m
resumed.
i/Vr ~ni titratio n'^ h t ives
tended to te^y
close, to the u >«. which the
;,ot t. :t the
' b'.
. ., ,ress, , .---.tee or. amH>< vices,
v-ubc;
,__ , gg. .itudi u?, <4fch
Con,., gd ess., 19 r .







government was blin .i to .«ed for a limited war -lit/.
:ce it was t is outi -tlve
cheu *are fid aed. j.e,
,
... adVoC'-itcati, th0ii9 - ;108
core ruga .a anything; but imi of
limited i VO#a *« eott!4 devalc 23.
4 first of tsess was a .^ive
mwi\y impulse, b optessber, 3L955» took its place
alo our uew mutual security treaties with -outi; r.orea, Japan,
Forsosa, and the Philippines la an at _ the hoiea
in the Fa* laatam dike. It* resemblance to .iA'iNj ended with the
tot , .;-•'.-/,'•, oeoau.:' I tensa arj a,
an I pledged ito ai trnatorie« (on;. w-'.ioa were on the -tic
sainiand) to 'consult" in .
th- iiad i'aot waa negotiate.;., und -tiah leader *?ith
Haeric rt, in sarlj 1935* tying Iran a: -.% to -an
and Turkey. t --.is are* also van Die beneficiary of th* ^iaanhewar
,
announced y; , Bssav this j.lan, eoono&ic aid was
provided and a "loo at* cloak of aaarli iltary protection** was
offered to any nation threatened by I ittUlt a .
Congressional | ...lent to send troops
to the ar*m M4si« Lis 11 -
fou iso of ion by proxy, a direct attack by the
,ion would probably call for • rospoaas with at . no
gee ic Halts*
, ^t secretary I war; at






tho oviet QbIod a privileged sanctuary iroa vr.hich to attack
rap©, MA¥0»© sailitary function *as i 1 ftNM in©
twofold one of acting &S a 11 re to signal cor.- unlet ..on
slowiag tho soviet JLr*jr*s see while s*ur i*-- dilatory force
, le include .t of a©eting a leao-than-uitinate
threat with a decisive but leas-trtan- jnae.
H BJtftta showed a preoct, LlM
wit. ' . MM for a ricrotii-tipa war, r;ur/;od by e&e** af;greaoion,
which ©vent the treaties would provi legal grounda for
:aentfi-. NT of retaliation wo saw fit to
u«©. Iin*< taeeS years also eaw tho continued recall orioan
troops fv eter : Ifl the
,
wevar, It would sees the leasees of sfclM had
not regie torod. iheae settees ees s»ith a elee to
filling a United MMP ! '*P» th© outcome waa perhaps sot too unfairly
©xprea.>«d ©j uobert . tg»»i when he atat I "while ea --.g
its political coa-itsente, the government continued to reduce it©
alii tar to support thetu"*'
But if pacta in I \m% areua .ere not too signific
Tror. t -e 'ie» of lisitad war, the SATO strategic shift
91
JLSH • ctofaer IT, 1957, pp. 1,
02
. .: historic shift I first
announce- I . t and
-ell," stl ©a 18, 1957 • **<' » -trata^y
in the u: 11 & >„...» Boag , ' - a lace of
' ted er in I . ». an d
,
.> aerie an .»o»;urity, ed,
Knorr (JPrlneeteai j v • ilveroit so, 195;?) • pp. 96*12




waa, not only for 3&T0, but Cor .nitod •%*%•« strategy as well.
It signified at least a partial abandonaen I UM do^a. that there
Id be no licatej sttr in .urope, ani it aorved ub a catalyst for
development u fcv Iks in the Bait I iteu.
a eeco tl tration t i»tr
lack a . rc^ii in MM deieuae budget was to declare
;icly that big wars and little wars were virtually the sasa
tbin^, and could be fought with the sane weapons, it seo&a likely
that thie logical restatement of th« ori, xnal aasaive retaliation
idea was enunciated sore to allay public feara of a presumed
liaited far ftayitfti than to serve as an action policy designed to,
in rin*e #ord8, 'keep froa loain ted warj without
94preparing t* via MM**" in December, reuide anhower
tol ne believed the aiaHlaolt— between
little ani big wars to be a bit artificial. §t preferred to sold
our security arraogeaento to meet the great threats, and laproviaa
to ::;eet Uie little ones, aayin, if you can't win a big one
95you certainly can't sdn a little one." This policy *ae reiterated
by {HMHretarv of the kit ,"orc« .-onald k t .uarles in he
proposed that lisit-. ion be net with "the full force of
atomic we
.
. ,i that wilm retaliation was as
convincing a deterrent to brush fire ear as it total war.













we have the strength required for global war, *# certainly t
aeet any threat of lesw itude." LI >aophy waa atrongly
•tt| jr the ^rce at all levels foot of of Staff
on do$\ . e poex -vice I orce,
,;lear wen; ..-. , repreeeal .1 tool for
or winning, Lted eara. Hi tatrtai partisan version
aeeae highly quae: le in il . ,ietory, there .-saw
justification for the edalmla js's baaic ar ,uaent, air
the . .. • Laterrenl ,riorit^ t ar-.i uly
aany weapons and such manpower -ices waj adaptable to
I ... of war. s weaknesses in 1
at; rcee, .-..ant, «ea and all
tactical air auppor I I hurt us . orea war seade
&ny leas weak aj theee statements* ine of the r;oes aevaatati
critical attacks on tfeis Administration policy is deliver
Genera.




£*r * ffl >tV' lc ^ 8^r -<? A >>on» and Fo reign policy , . •
a
" H ue 1ear
Foreign Poiicyi Liaited is,*' jThj • lie,




. iit«, oc triri
I loiicv," ir orce. Us!, . u. 1 (January, • I;
*14.nlted far i there ( ery t — - »"
3avr-Air .iorce .iu/1 iater, , . Is>l6f i





. ? U»l/. 1959). 3o-44» . •. ayJ
Core it -tarts," ;.raed ;ori;u. . -.n - ^ , .7
ril, 1. . ,, 24~2f)} :obert C. tii on, ".c e laex ted
ir , .jrce
. UX1, . .rcn, 1959)
•
; and Bear? . ellio, "Coaposite -.ir Irlke florae,
"




«• have the atren#th required ior global war, *# certainly
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neet any threat of les« itude." llOMBaj wi»3 strongly
I by the . levela fro» the Chief of
on do*. . he poaition. vice orce,
iiii:. lear *«a; • , represented the id*sal tool for
or winning, liftitael ware* I I eatreaa partisan vc:
aeeae highly questionable la .ictory, there
juatifica tion*a b&aic ar.-vuoen t . Carl
the lerramt efcaa ve aaahar one priority, M illy
ssany weapons and auoh the services *»a adaptable to
any kind if aar. I weakneeeeis in li: it:. -J em*
at. , I'ceii, it, eea and air lift, M
I air support, Meat §a4 hurt ua li la ore* were not isade
Mir loaa weak tj thene atate^ente. i'fie of the noss devastating
critioal attacks on itration policy is delivered by
Genera
07
ia art 1 of Jeeies .. i.-.,. ' . kaclaivi rev-
&*r ' fi t;ucl®^r .-eAjjona and Foreign rolic^. . *; a " H uc 1ear
Fore enee,*1 The
_j^ ;-.:- !Uic»
July l, 1*57, p. 18.
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•ee, e. ., : onera I m .. hite, oetrin
' i^dL-£2£2S.i &* *•« i (faaaary, • li
- i , - -"
Kav^-Air , ore?: .;iOfU3tor » . f .. . . 14-105 •





45*47; . . traaad, Urpawax*** ,' -r . orce,
. 7 Wuly, 1955}i M*« - . fejlaad, "He
itei Core It *tarta," - :.raeJ Forc-i; -
.
^
na^ / q^n t , .,







. llio, "Coapoeite sir Strike Paraa,"
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Lisuted war is a ore highly t I -listed form
of doatfee. 1
realize I . It, 1% OftlMMI little
6»M30 tC





k thar- onucieer-euuipped B-*>2 can contribute little
a
- .-. *j| am contribute to III -ior. ttf a
ffie riolotov,
I so»e, limited war differs Ifren ffoftovo) war
in I aot ... .:t true.
.ted ear is not a setter of tins«. It h ted
in tne objective t, tho '<eans employed, . ,
usually, tne area in a Lt is fought. limited
ear yay
,
, as • to . jtrut
in China, furthermore, there nay be several lisdted
ware ail going on at the sase tiwe. . .is
is the r„oet 0*010 :re of future *ar* a slow,
.ion of io
. political situation into It lev,
• see
co^e wito • xat progr^e. of this
;re re tive, st Lo planni
,
a.'j highly specialised tactic .1 foroee. m%
rior to anyt ttr,
decisive: trio*. Of the several IV. .ireae
I
,




Tire power all re OOiol , «11
tO lirai t
tied at best, and gro4 si I iected
rst, m our '-an
years
.
in spite ctary pVOOOOfOO, the extvoa . n-
e*u ^rce a
,
the fir» verbai cox.
the -ration, iway » .
11. : force . j "
, ,
-as oa, .rried
an authoritative article on our Oilit
stated that* "-
avis, pi . 126-i .

1accepted th< , ij of the:. ,
- > :..;'•-..... .ia
latt«r saa to &av© & a .? t• i v e airlift oapafellity ai 1c
weapona as conventional »e lor t -i p-urpoaeu. ... ie
.-sous ground forc»-
the . fcft it
r%3 IUMI of ssobiie
American ground tt*lta«*-"llj t forces," rub
supply tactical aaaiat&nce i oal 4*4 rs were not able to
. ; lict. lUnrutt our for;. Ul be
cots.ittoi to defena niXl| engaged—centrally located
and re i anywhere.
KMUTitj ill's 1955 cilitfu review
showed a sarRed trend f aa I en
dieousaed atjovo, alt» ; l->!?6 ..;ed to
apply to underdeveloped are&o only. ecretary uilea res sd
the trend in 195^ » "Ma he t ;>ur theory of i« terrenes
wa# to Halt ft***"*!! the use o its, weapons, ana art: -.is-- to
109the ali needed to ;ot,..r and to repel a
.
.
- tali »ai (• la | . moepil
oi" war hel 1 .legists. Qmton na,
the i. il aeon In Uke cleasio sold—that of
'The Pistol and tiv Law,"
, ,
. 16-17-
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miAtaialag • profs: teleua II^>1 OSion by
wnrtitte -,obiliaati ..;••• to tight a lar^e-aoalo ground *ar t .->uch as
, m , •* an oxt«: , dim, .nee fcht Xi na
•sttasok had reinfore mhi :p«ek vivil far, the




. i« s.r«y v iviMgt yr.
There was no ti*« lisatiM in a bruahfire w -r.
forces had to ba tilt if M** wars
>e faced x'^it acco^li
action. I b* as auoij -ic&i a ~ ry
as they s> It&vy, MM pro frill* than
•/ MM&fiftAtiOM, has since steadily I tsad
104
.lie favor of
the I'U.itsd vat UtlHtl« y's 1< iefsnsive
been raiaforcsl fcj v^i *fi ' - *&** widely
accepted as a aajor , change for the
first lias avfclia evidence of a loss M policy
1 r





years the tnilitary strategy




Is aaa* w .,'reaex"- - ily
.city to :
human rsic>.-.
:.ve. in recent yaaiPa there has b«e« no
>sr, ssfulnesa of khoat 1 i-vs





our ration in tn«
i,of sh to alter I
. aulcsar sa*j . It sees* now that
...
w .. . harts to humanity. Uocont t«ssts point
to ti-
the a«atruc !,iv^acuti >ta of sh-
targe
it My .-as ibis to placa
less . . • - ry
••..*, It mj In poaai la ic . *;rie«
.. weapons so aobile, or ., 13 to
-.-..
•„...',
.:•_; _ .v ... 1 ,,-, tltfe soiiTentlo&al ..'--ice .
hazardous ( .1^6
It not a , but t At
aceei -aaaaive aatall c«
Secretary Dullaa* aaatu. 'rur be«n as oxtrore
..ie critics bad pictured it, Ihi change ia not one of a*J
significance, it ia still a strategy of limitation, aa was his
original, but it ytill doe t the ;,e«pt of
var. . S#S| on text., it is
necessary to trace trie ftaralapsaat 1 nuclear aaapaaa
raft! ar.
.
-.t.i.c^ l nuclear ^eapong
taaa aaav , »raa ..cted Ma -•
Flirat »rity 1
tar, iaa j>aa attached
to lha urtiilei\ «% 11
,
John roster Dullaa, "Qfcallattf* ana Haaponse in




: . . . Li.
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guided i^laoile warhead. <sarly a:, :ber, I95f« ^-iairal
.ford 0*0 ablw .•>'- • &•• virtually
liMMfcl ut/itu:i iff - rceo. . itary
service is otpttbit- of i§ this weapon into ry use,"
fh* M -—ae its d04 I Ft, not its critic
oae it—would not -«en p. to without tactical ato;r.ic wQipo.na,
it it ri« eariv vereiooi of Iklfl BOO ty^e of battlefield
ordnance that «crt*t slit*' whole ffl tory policy w.ta baaed.
iey were available in c >le diversity aa operational
tnc tic.il f«*j*NMI - . .-reed the bci aw
Iook, which wad designed to us»e their firepower to compensate for
lack oi" MNfcj - aoarnber 17 of kftfct year the lAfV (toioil
decided to aatern sill Vary strategy jal
t^egic use of all ty^ea oi nuclear BMpomo, alt tney
woui two to rmla MtdOff nited 3 to.too control, tlttti
;f atonic aocr«st*» srau pro&ioitoe'
;*t k&lo clearly one of ?.>,ayaive retaliation.
• d*v<*lo,"ssenti» wer nolle, a vocul ao^^ent of
e4 opi -;-ad strong criticise of tlM uec.
criti-w-ius- u ;u««; a.. have I strength in
the intervening yeara. . .• .1 it teato*o4 Ml t*o taj
• t lear 4 r the
fought with the?* oouii rt—ll II
















- HM ii |i _! ii. i j i,|i
3evoraaont poliey on I levolopaent of tacti
waupo * ia traced 1] ,
_
» Not TOO I
The -tory c>; .ri.er and tiro thor ,
P. vii.




nor o • on,





weapon lii bain*, developed, no
firr BtrntOfla concept for its use in limited .?ar had been dev«lop»>
In Knvnit, 19 r) r>, 1* * WKTim vii* epeeehea I inferences,
>e -ecretary of tate eos&ent. riher on
atomic weapons. f I vol d use
MM , which , ****oy military
ill
targets »i iian center**" iy
changin- tlii cit that enunciated in January, ts . ^ident
win any cost bat [ ic
*© ] can be used on strictly .areata and
for strictly sail .-:;;, - *ee no reaaon why
they ah.ou.Hs 1.' f you W i,$e
a Let or anything else.
I believe fen n bout .
tningfl oones then you begin to get Into thoae areas
whert k make sure that you : .era ting
merely again*
t
nt with that one




a -iueried at a press com". iMMt III nrent cy
in hlfl January and -arch ttatenente , suident declared there










p. 4, ar Lb, If! , . 1, 2.
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* Ibid.. Karen 17, . 1, 4, 16.
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tactical ato&ic weapons wouij not be used, ftfl ited »ar<i, in
which ftftfJJ «ouia. UsftlJ ... 1 .:;t ok the pr&c I
lot if 41 , «u-active H,u«Eoy-i,»tau
* 11!dispute.
in general, t<>e c - in drawn iroa theae statement** ftUSt
be tftS n wa^ a aignifleant part of our Mliill , but that
: strategic pros. tt it I - - ifti war
solved.
Th* public qttitt predictabi rstftd thcs*>«» announcements
and cl&rif ic&tio/; . .. ifta of ft 'a
poi tv ion to graduated deterrence, ail*
it ie fc*l n« latter naue avaaat de :cribets ths
Adt os sa_ , the
55 ao net sees* to re at u significant
--e#y.
In a view vyry close to ths I atration's, ths case for
tactical nuclear weapons was well expressed b . irra/,
• aeaber of -oaic ^ner^y Coasission, in i.pril, ipfj&i
-he luture will be nuclear 1 ft] •... sit
dot: | ted 00 ftXl«MMit -.uolt. 1
I-out nuclear *ar Li - . acceptable
r or suicidti. It
SO drift into tho habit of shinkiaj about
nuclufir vfti . • si
ral effort of »i«otrfrn civilisation to iapasft
::t in the
nuclear a#«, c ear ii a possibility
cos c
l t U POBS
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; sa , enate, 3uim
n
Control eduction of An t s .
i, ftdta. ooyii. , 2d ss ., 1956» P» 35*« ^or a broadar vi,







nistrution, strongly spurred on by the Atz.
,
.-ass tb« tei . ih«iije tactical ,.s.r««, I
t
tip
le of fi. witn nuclear »e . By now the
critics sensed a new drawback to MM ail-er, :ry
shift that :
-.iafo pi&e. . wssphaais on
tacti- ajKes em* so great that "ore<i<t ware rapidly
Hit* to itional war— that I ur equip-
ment and weapons woulJ force us
one. Pheir fa »ere I Iwrt ehe.: ...•aide*: ,
speaking about . • I . . , . al
..tine part of our
©quipaant aaaaviaya, u;) j J^u would alai i . vt< to uss tfeen, x.h»
116
way our :orc»y are organised ia that area.**
uil«j' tarttol -ot«4 above ... ished
*n T.-?J- ffair a ir. Jctobar, 1;'57, tha t ai brsakthr in
opsent .-ail-yield xt*-i-yon >at as to
disrate Ut a**j fjFM Kaaaivs
re'. „ wide diversity Meal
ate .ow M far Ml ovsr I existed
wh*n fefcO **•&« lie/ I tad, tfeat
art. , a refinement
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on the fance. It was certainly not « ad b<K;.;, ja« of
"pure" MMfive fm% «leisanta o: pMNMAt* 1*he
,
-,. >-i. , tegio raaervrt Um I ki»
tion fc* liiiengagess., at be • , I yed
agtb *a>t mki a v.veo t, toaie
weapons, yet tlM 4r«y « lite ~. ty
,
with the <reneral lM . I flexibility, -any
wu.ro pie:. -city,
la the iitsiv- lift , in Iw
117
str> - ;--,r iCi* taa.-t organiisnti
illy ss !.-. . |
i
*d a clti .jqt for Mm f>l<iJflHll
I , .rtj.culi.ri., in li »t cc
aegl-actc the rson-ralit-.r.., j . . war efiarfcs.
war w&e seen as uy xn &u-e;v» t
aithoa t ,<; our r there wa;; . r, but ther vtry






eesspona could be use.
.
scene in .-ctobt=r, l$57t ' —
•
vic;t • • trx. crisis within
the &&&%•£ . iat< . . * jg u^loas »ot .c-e
and ittgi&e/ftrlaj ... Latelj In cti->r; i'orc>. wurit-
pol reversed |)m nation's rulia















the .ifzinistration eft .v^ral y toft the :oviet
i was already In
lead in sosse fields, th« ial secrecy prevailing la
fros ? Lj kr.uv . .
L« a*are * UMMt*« planning accepted
oviet equality
,
cases a. . . . of
:*tm weapons. <o , . tnik following close on the ?i©als
viet*a firat successful intercontinental tallio'
-.lie tost, the daa bur*?t. :he reaction of & OfiSJ
ot bee . tier fnet j a, . ^lied
strong pressures to the adsinis tration. Both tlu I public
ana the sore-vocal i Ml elite ueaanded that
shifting itary power b« altered. Jr.© growing
uneasiness about national eacur at had been spreading
the ranks of att- tt past MfflMNkl years was
now reia forced astonishaer. the MM in the
street, I .Its aade themselves felt in several waj-..
?he Caithwr a.< . Mm '.lite
concensus. io it is
ioci a . »i incre; lures.
,?.'<&£oiler ranal wide a ooaprehe&elve' ft*
ftllltar tturs "all t% v*ell with pret
.
::..c.;rit,. policJ -ion, . atr -
lags benind iei in the world




by the coar.ent* " iiave tfe*t klM ••« . .*s




accmoray <• Cord Ma naoeeaar.y jaeaeurea." ?ho report
»tres.?edi that liaitad rented oiir "soot lisiel i-at,''
sendee: urtloa'S Halted war aii'ort bo vastly
It ii* therofore .
r rati I . ««• , we dtvaloj
ervene r. lie to
«er felt ... or
is task wo require ttod«ro eea lii't and an airlift
.
. .;. ty we . tejr ehile
:>#ible liraitud
'
. . . ittvolvi i i ml
• to »tioita« 4aro say
iear we* uey way involve convent
t.0
let border lr. sura ions.
thus
ur anaistskabls ability and willingness to c
*i.th force at whatever level o;
be required. uo not now possess the necessary
Vai'olitili t,y .i-"
This report r- cuivai widespread distributor
, MM
Of the virtual ity of the diverse
shi, j.y
ojrt repress




'Hoekefoiler Irothert . -1 -ecurity* 'he
,.
i l > apect . iport pOOiftl fcu





.r a highly tivn analysis of the b and
fc 3««s nostow, The .:;atc








.-create ii f the
r c-ji*flt - : .txoi) effort,
aanagt new look waaentially he
sense of . iuge *aa deflated
strong vat iVftlftpMMftt of a powerful lir
war cajpabllil ite
it . U^ Bi
to -tar/ - aa&jr
f«lt . itary ^security, iot all »aa
lost, hoiftre-r, as waa the case with other i'oroes urging a change
towuri littitftd **> in the
,
»1T«4 national
policy another DM laaaaive ret&iiuti. .
.o .resident §*' H to tl <ited
war pro 01 e: in ov^a'oer, ] , the M
olea : ;sipt to eliRLuate
.ml force*) • MB retaliation ,
"
uecret.ury ^ulles a I iare<i that mm
liait-vt war itN !*• .darucortKi th^
A jue prot;I«;. trope in Ihit r I tnere wa»
124





The budget prise in< is,
itle effeet, .-nepers" al&o did
th«ir bit
i
a $362 Bill! ... ^a«
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ly tfce tis© of il's annual
•icy'1 fur 1958, '-.ho
Oiitlov liaitaa «ar MM for
-
»«V#r^l ya&ra. * r-y, av , fcal IftJriUM ..
that would eatabliah finite limit to the retaliatory forc«, and
propoeed a flexible its Mali .<s4
war» wiV; or without MUr wa**pofta. vhey au^esV. all
our strategy w© be arefiura© to establish lisiit©4 obJt?ctiv
Bft&itayjr operation©. I rt>M * reversal of aotiva: M4 ve
^ea of arata waft r*rco- ciided, with th« atonic retaliatory
alesonta ^e©oaia& W of the I -ited
war fore- iroxa | f delay! , to a "flexible
aword for parry, l . .* <*oul4. involve I ng
I affie&a *ar PM not poaaibla tn
. vunced i
i.r . :;rC'j, Ml Jeneral Nathan ?. ?winin#, n#» Chairman of tha
efa, Qj . ; .. . iw4 a
nation of the g_ tatus
:
:jtto of sanaive retali*til
propoaei | eivM
lift©, a ijgll he,;-' C tue ii^. ,©4
when tha iMiftlM ««4 ifMil
of ianoa
but ¥% P OGr: Lf)W| "
Mil t- . , iaa fiac^i
was sa&e ooiiar
!! »I| HW1...H — I. H .l« ,.*..»». (l ..!«. «. |.„I«I, «.—>—« — III MII IH I I I-. . ! H I I ,» , , |. , , l» | , | , , „ , |. „ |,l , I . . I, I II | , m I-
12 r>
. la
pi or, . . "
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deed i service, strategy to reaain frozen
in th*= pa of IM 1 . year.;. 11;-% tha ii'sited
ior&ted uo&eehat because o
08 a relatively larger portion ;ere abuorbed
railing coat* of the newer aiseile systems, jui-aited war
advooatea, i^d by Smumt
.
I on behalf of their
beliefs ,ar ft#£«aae laa wi »«t**aiveljf ore-aided,
avail. : i» only significant g?iln froa the 196 et
wad dr, La th« field oi .c education. :>rt
aiv m of opinions aaong the Joint Chiefs, ettata* •.ohneon'e
Preparedness invest!^ vtiu teu HUtl these i :.iy to
testify openly on their reeer at. The dft,
of the aos.isK existing eitala I nta&on «a >t fully
revealed to the public, ai ght to the alrea.iy-e.Ki..'
uneasy dout. ecurit/, and rca-iitin. La laax
re on i tion. Frfillt aenhower ato
ho»ev*:. | mm to a preaa conference ; , .-gflooting the
alia aaxiety, a* to efcatfea* ~>und forces wc?re capable of
handling sfe fire aituati..::, te replied; '*X*d aay tnia* If
we can't, then the atur*a gotten beyond a brush fire and you've




terse. M or well-r 3 discontinuity La .
I trust, wi • a
,'ire or police action, which coulu b« eappreased *l
126
SifUN ... thess I ior tha iir
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such ef-'crt, ©thin, , tzuch . , vhich would have
to ba t o» a completely ciiJfl- acale. he reft
N Ite&tea aar.
otion
,» ^ MW^.W.—* i.Wm .i..,.,^.,,,*, , ,,—.—i
battle;* s«re b .
, t*o Haiti . aa
,rred
July, when la Cii-oun's pr: • 01
Lebanon appealed for tm&9l4 it « tkreate urrecti on
ted by outeide iorcea, our reaction *aa eJUMei ;,antm!«oaa.
tary )uileo %*oa«"ly advised the -oopa, on the
beiitti the rinks o I taking action w«r* n thoee
of .- no, iTeeident ^ieenhosrar abroad, fefct order.
i *ith «r,ic . tail se«iaie*l to eaploy ground forces ir. a
li»j kOtioa wee aade gut;<#3ts the extent to ehich the i-.d<sini»-
tr&sioa^o original **••**« retaliation | ^phy had been modified
hy i mitlii oi' t . ur yeare.
..ntkl reason behind the decision to interv«ne
that, ^retar UUM 1 *orde«
w«re oonvinced t I wa did not, there »o ;
[ ] tively




auch fftWejRHtettta , o that they eould not . . . feel








> intervention thra* 'J to
sharp raiiaf. DM «aa tha esattar ant wi-
lt i* «id«i t . avad that i .»ra w«r«* not c ~.ad
.if
* vie ions and mcr- >viei
urope. ..iahoci diplomatic records -1 that thia is
Nt»«i that t i oi* thfc ssove MM to
150
aabaaa&dora in cl the »ove was ardor*--
.
ctionis of alliaa wero ovarridaan in • », but Ihu t-.tr-
Mobility nitod E»t*bft* ftfttl - b« has stru;
by reluctant tr:
>»d war raiaal by >n,
alao 6 controversial on J»W effort,
Ufl* *ts regard* airlift, Mt*M*Wa Q u«
airlift mam j. roved -.? in» m%
of ovtiii thlfl contingent, : >•-
alue-^'iah.
ba&ad - t#g, lortJi Carolina, Ml for just, ti:ia
sort oi* c ot be u»*d beoaut >ir
;>ort. alee MtS
I .jsant MM obsolete* Thay
further cu tt of two divisions out of rxy
waakof:- .at sensitive area «h«u interna', a wara
M
,
t.e^ic ai; . MM
:)iiitj of v U i at a t: rent was
129






aoat naedad. * nay regard Lebanon iva proof that our
fig : ve retaliation xaacuiateu oar I d w&r
abili 1.
, I a aajor defenaa tteift . fte
.or*s . rtari a*i4 that w« MOV1 ion »ith
all tfct apead, I'oroo, and efficiency required, and that a g*»»tt»
effort e .»ve be »eded. Uaraful analyaia
.4 eeass to Indicate that the cjs arts nearer the truth. it
ia ... i« that the t was aufi'ieient m this saaa,
but MM signi-
ficantly in., d in apeed and impact haa Ofpoaitioa M ia
An intaraati;. on tb " iting
attempts ia provided b^ i^Xor, aha r ray
|HW< John rocket, »>ilch MM available in nvy trsuiaporta
it, iti not allOV I could fira atomic
taa
aarhaada aa nail a.i conventional oneu. y .3 Hart
hit hard at th ins tactical atomic »* will
ba uaad in aa^cata that if our
forcoo io :-ot attt** atro .vtmtiot.&l aria they ©ay ba at a severe
idvantage w ecisi -> - Bid* that the of
. t for
151
ae, ••( ., t>rup, "Limited »ar and the -me





. pp. y-I . 4 i r-. ...





Lebanon «i*«rged as a draaatio cold *s*r victory for th«
United tatoa. In apite of thin, cr ?>» ^c^u^o oi it, this
action did r,ot h vv# any c ive et£wtc% ?m%iai\* a * y.





nndoracor nt no *nt of Iff
: ifcrow no* li t I cobs. •-..-, •€
ten lo training yx-rciso for - rvioea the.-salvos,
JfefittZ
in Ml - ,
,
I thw iy
/olvod in the Lob .itery«nti,n, kfct »feia«»« liats
Qtt—HBHtdl a nouv; t&4ft, .u«*;.-;Oy
and iiatau. tkt§ MM tne vh hore for tsors than throo
yo&r., , HI unlet preaauro and throat;, built up it
rod th.at M iftwasd -nont. xhw I of
MM ;hO£>o island® - t of attack
FlgM in the I ; utial M -ho
orssoaa that had follow
bo&bardr-ent and tl M ova ,n, >,m aaee to
aabi^uity w »;-d f al lliMMI of -eor^t-ry halloa* own
highly honed art
,
wh 1958 cr: roae.
•
5
* or a ion of s«o
-•^ of
—-•^Ax^.t , . - L« *hs key element
of bri:
, , I® *'th« 3d tte creation
of a r. .
. trol. it is tho $*stc*ic of &sll l«t%3 ition
at Gl' ay
bo intolerable to o aoc m.
na . . . fct ktsa a
aturb t4a no Ink wlu
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Une . ' first statements, #•
Lde, act Mutt jut
would fee .surdous for anyone to j?t
rid conquer these is sou. - -sited
3,554
nation," ' *s trie cj , ' i«nc«s of
.rati . ' . v MMM wO or
retaliation occurred wi I :ricy, ,>& tho crisis
continued, the iaenhower-fullea I into -able
.fix."r-c
,
lie of tro •< llftlM ift4 violent attacks
a liberals at tieao and froa abroa.. , rtxeuiarl/ .-'arope.
MUM no* r.ot th i estate th I , a pr ; .*«
•-treat ur. ,re. I end, with Ml* a 1 *.tary
-;nt, the coc:-.,ur. lata retr&ated a-
scored a ttgaftl victory. Sa4 we stooped to a,
face of this list ted profef -:i«j?sayed frievau Mi alii**, even
-je eho pro touted ..ur action, would have ^ther step
to noutr iisss. If we backed down here »« to reuist
a&gre , the reduced credibility e| our will to resist
the ai i. 1 have been costly in tersu* of tlseo, lives,
-t.
excellent example of mutual limitations Baa be seen ev:
in the ai-.o»t ~iarv operations :.
ma has always claiaed a territorial .,ea of twelve
.--.?., -«t sht. itted cm a to a^prouch to wit ^
t4MtogHiaa4 lisi three- >y without being fired on.
nationalist land. la, to which we transferred 1 os, were
«<ew York Vk^, .ttgtt»t 24, i95*t Pp. 1# l«
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th«*n taken under fire e» aeon aa they croeted the three-axle
Halt, la return for this unspoken agreement, *e 114 not use
our aircraft against Chinese aaatM .uries. ^ -'he fast that
the©*;* Haitatio I effe«tiv« despite their il.iui;io and
th»ir tucit nature teacnea :.. . lia&ll I ;cess. ?
i -^, ,.oi".. JirJ,V;,„v;f8.w- , .ftQftjfe
wer years drew to a close the k#y
atr .stern was still ov«rwh«lr.,. that of the new look.
.. riuAfl since it., luce, tioil, the Boat
noticeably of which ware a alo«I r. lafl i«arcneaa o£ the
i war problea, and a relax- rlgf A*#aa iasive
ratallatl taaaatJ * look—
.
et&ry
.;. : tegy, a aachines-i t-of-sen
.iy, a tendency toear -r&wal, and
an avasraliaa** i . . . r to all rail it
problti' -
. 1X# jno,
and announced policies of ihv 'iaenhower otiate
eeested to lad Ilea a ?ed
for a -yd war capability, i i,.;et patterns, . in the
final 'd str
,
heavily one-aided in their
•aphasia on the as. , la*.
lis.
Ki»«in< sr, e aecsaslt:? for Choi ce, p. &1.
' ?o* a perns trat. ... b of the
,
C« BKBBieatlOA,








The ahift toward a I capability had been slight
despite the trosendoue | of y - *nt$ as Indochina, the
reiler .eg.ort, ana Lebanon. .a Budget IfetiMBt of
,
while elabcret •••-".>'. f*ei<le)at isenhowar
had emphasised: 'it eatial to have a o f Ion,- -range




re a ponao .10
:
%ran a 1 1or ,y XML*" in a remarkably similar
stateaent sore than throe years later, which veil illuatratea the
consistency of hia puliclee, the ^resident e*J -ceaaary
to follow a plan, and that "It would be ruinous to be juaned off
this ;l<;n fetef and again by soaething d#»cribed ho a crisis
.
ever a one tea incidents I vther it is sputniks
or It's HiiMBy ... or Itelilsi it , gftll has a 'new
anawar." '
But if the 11' 1*9 1c iea ware relatively
,
v«d Halt xeca.
Set only nave *ar forces—©anpower and equipment—suffered
at *.'.'..- budgetary surgeons, but, nor rtantly,
the ( strategy, which la jyetoa la largely
datersii.ve . tofrsieM m 9 hae inevitably
euff«r*d. %t u. . i,o sake a i -cas
available, and since these «er* red to eke M ion
patter-., an effective .United M tgjf was preclude!. urther-
aev®ral ye upae between the b<Aisic
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-ii« election caapaigo proper, th occurred, in
the elate? of ly'ty-Vib-
,
:efeae© defeat.?.
. ., the isenhoser &J:ain, -ion, I t it
a«e« best -'»e4ad in fefc :«ld, and r i%|
its "1 OAlp lightly expanded fey the
inc: at threat ner military coet levels. posed,
att Btr -tion fftl _*,
I aoBSi le aspensitaroa, sag
coaiiti--, arrange* in two r groupings—Jcagreaelonal jweocrats
influential businessmen, nominal > tolioaa, but le practice
a
virtually no - -*iaun. "
Altho aaue e&a one of overall a
posture, liaited sar c*wce to the fore on occasion.
It n&a out th,t spend! - aclotir n^rdvare
'ro® | - - in fcftfd I . .at
1
level of
about 141 billion for fie<
uj wi r arson t;
his pea t&s
of 0a La order to
erltieiM Mia iefeuse; ,;.ob*rt
,










. id been cut i and a half
^lon MM to ,-ed
tho remainder raiuu . . . -tor Johnac its
.txioa itteo founa MM put
need iesrniis&ii ,' ri I* - I ths needed rifles
4
MM) vine-tenth of the neeessar fee.
As h&vo been prt . I, however, tne alight increase
in defense wera
able t. :.)St no efi'act on li r MU fflfHi ,
a result, toll -he accumulated pressure carried ov |o
the |»lfn itaslf, I Vice ~xen I dee a
vk*& shift la hit lefttnee caapaigni-.-
,
fliMl
irmc? and t tfeaftalttff's
heavy- - proposals,
:>r to -jal conventions, an ev<
occurred which MM iitre a M&fOttfti
secur..
,
, . , llapee of the
faria suaait cjnfarence changed the entire t«f«a#4 -j-e.
rresiient isenhower** answer was a ssodest •-&& in th *ce
age" pro,*;;-- .•-- -laris, ti B*?9 f the airborne alert,
08, etc,' Hie cr
,
the :>enate D«MttU sm
out etJ aeroe -board defense increases,
#er- uorhoo w J # « §lllioa a ;n













f. I«. m of th« to link the eaaoit collft I the
iKMMUr budget, oia, * *qu i. . have ao
abuaed the ?raeident ani«:; *!%#*« |a this
6
he i tlly aupported i (sell ani yKiinfjt
Against this . cc>av oct«d
c&uiuiaatee . i-bearora, ana agreed
upon their ri-apectivo platforms, j. Mb ..anka
of theae latiwr aoci. , the Mow ¥ork Tlaoa declare.. visitor
-, anot lava thai. HM two
7
itfc>r;vsa ar« talkli -at the ItM iefenae establishment,
dlfferaneea cor. ..itiee, however. Fhey >ut
leva! of I ol the soviet throat, -..
both pr-iCticnliy Ignored the question of 1 . >»t
.
! Bturtli:. voiuti
place new t , ublican plutforn reaffirned
saaaiv*? r ,1 the atiffeiu: od ey ri«r
•llttF, lie greatest «.r:phaaia on the "new fan**
of **fepmts c * a the iy
mobile ft Mftt&ll forces deployed to 6»W* or check local
: *brueh fire wars* *hieh bring on ail-out
8
nuclear **ar. M ooratlo pl»1 squally vagm
about lira tad war.
,
bowever, ia one atop furt). -.he
publican platf. l^e to 'recast our aiiitarv capacity -
order to provide forces and ^eapona of a diversity, balance, and
6
U-±. . PP. It-*9«
7
ew York , . .
.:.' axeer^te free and coaventa on kh<





.lit./ sufficient la quantity ani quality tsr both .united
a
And general ag^r-aa lions ." It also . a strengthening of our
c>nvcmti a wa*j nf liy praaan*.
M uane t lif£«*an<M in Llaitaa ar pMltlMM waa
disc*;.- between the caft.iidatea. Vice I ..ixon had
backed off, soaswhat reluo MtlffBl pole of the
tivt r- - tion spf-s . ;or
."'jller '.tial v-r-ublicans.
5S aa kMlvin Itified
lie;/,*' io had been ..-vely
.•?bate until tlte Biaaile issue of lat©
-', g««*«4 I itod MUT tf itely
nuB a fhue a c< .i«
&14*%4M a as wall M ftf tho pla: ., <rave little
11
or what araa to cor^e in Unite tvatag .
o saee was true also of the oar se
was rsot I r issue, it certainly looked Murff*> Uuui in 19$©,
a bi partisan?.-:
.
corni; BttTltj »licy that had
rk of cold ear : «d
'. m Lj . One r< r thi-
ng was that the Deaoer&ts, while favorin ae
o
-,.-,.-, >ion




A perceptive?, . vt* accur
what
be 2 . t that he i -
Lit t tori .. & a and a. ; *n to have




effort, . beon e&l -iah it b.•-.. ;.' the *||I ^urt/"
label, area.
Altho . olic e . . folia - s-Ajeaproad
rt fur stro .
,
...
that when -^uss tiotied OS to which party oat likely
to ore war, the* voto; rojriooly chose
oane by a substantial sar^in. N OOO&toraot
kootloo •. mot, iftioti ooa :iar,
th«? orate also had to 0*4)3 loos their identii'U-
Vito «i>»iaiili t sbiob vers
Slow there seeaed <„o be an ;.;.crowed jublio s f : tary
.e anu ••%# were relate i, so the juaocrata b peak the
old . si *-Ail an aabivaleuco a liaf within
fc> can be oo Uto fail ratio Coajfroso
to .ia»ee during *] il*'
»e« oftos loo oo&vontions,
..v.jiv . ior paign
.i it hai in the previous one, li still ignored.
n in the "oounterforce Ta, finite rent" arguaeot, it was
not generally It -d that whiles thi i'oroof posture could, in
eo: -uure, detur botb large ana sstall »aru, tin* Lowtof could
onl- &otO* lMf« Mi t mMI thua would require a linitea war
ca; a eoEpanion piece,
^i^ited a_r in. the Interregnum
A number of ievalop'-.cnt.a too cm bottNN l«tt
isdy's else* .
.
launching of the new frontier in Janu;.
1961. bofoi u, however, it La desirable to ooasont
silitar.) policy in the oiotoi . -1 51,
As i'«. lUt of the : is placed
12
SOl . .'ton, ;he Campaign,*
S ew fXi *•* l^t i . . 16,

189
ties in the —JBipalpi. cosing fta tor. Ml MM al. preaeur©
araea li ht, U w look slipped another notch. In
December, i<M>Q, military analyst . -. wrote*
j4 of Any famine appears to be over.
.-..r








an xcopter* which can airlift M infantry squadron
[
ale] with weapona.**
He noted, howover, th at the - tve a . that
id be airlift* , a a the
follomr-.,.
,
prepared by Charlea M. Donaelly of tha Legislative
ftef «re«ic ,? i co.
. lill t. f the
tatea that, if involved i; *ar
«<; woulu . in any ease where auch uoe
«r, a to the tags of the united Statae, • ora




eoaedajr, being placed position of having to
respond ait uclear attack
or to Tic* defeat because of t eaknesa in
The oatge . trends.
lialtos war aide of tha scale were - teas aa a well-received
via, i. roc tor oi bor
for Internationa- r. , te
Nportnonf** Polio* P1sa&: toff, *h, . goo, a
thin.,,;;, ".. ground atrengti ioiont ska
liaited S*V Oil :tuai POSOibllitv in
lit
"Jack •:& *»*• iJ i u i' efenaes
,
Policy
3u lie ti n , ;.eceKber 1, i . .• , < . 47.
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i. ..., . : .
,
.ialati/e lleferenoe .tvico,
^Lta-A , - i a .lyKvU . :;7: . , lat «;'.;.,




rope. " this trans' w«re the peraiatwnt ruraora,
attains;! jr factually oriented, that - raeidar: »nhower w&a
a ;» sitatrswal frc ope, to nei i tne
budget and to assist in n ft outflow of gold, r i«
latter posslbilit- Itat tat iruv plant* for
NATu nuclear sharing, a step which would drive posture furt an
evwr fro$ a conve tbilit .
of which I were going, however,
saeaed to i>e answered wit. a few days before it
I-MHlHj took office, when kaa| .ieer.hower subsaltted till 1962
.«t. Fas new look waa .itiil the earmark of ItfMM policy.
ItWfgtn #hs par,.: la 10 attest fe . :>3ts. <u.*lear
weapons ware a till military pouturo, U « of
dif ficuitiea t- la posed for a eobfcront coalition strategy in
Europe and for a aear. 1 ana»ur ',o a-zbiguous tjaalltttft ';he
&T*y areas. The lAgtt message read "trc,
withdrawal' 1 between cv ry line. thilt the text of the aessaga
aplke a ~ and it, roving the I . -1 iorooe—ground
,-c,
., tictical air w- , a-nd ailitary airlift— the it
allociti ...v,:ed a cc look.
the .42 billion budget provide! for an ^r&y of I
foartaaa Laati ft 1 - : ,
,
hij/8, three
marine division* and < ...no sir wlaga, with a totu.1 Corps
17
strength of 17 ! , ! , an MNis bjw , a t,
15
w forfc^.i,^; , October 13* i^oO, . .... -aaber





>>er 17, .1 ' , . " , January 16, ' , ; . 1,
, I, .11.
17
.y.,aagtt see i bid^n » ^anu-
17. !«**• pp. 16-17.
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I terregnusa, tb« direction that dafanau policy
would t*Jte« under tUa now . r.
I'he daval .vol the iMt j*u») *ua the mch-
.hu , chaired b rco-
oriuntei UMP a M fa up with the assistance of a fiv*-*an
at.:., laolu U ..jcretfiry of Dal -jwell
.
.
^atric, - loot ia earl icwto i
it i sically a ae» dafeno on pi ,
it nrouaed obscured aaat oi the side iaattaa '-hich al»o *a#*B to
I lO I Igat at t -30. Ml Gil ;
r«plac#a*-. Maaaad a true
oostzaaU -- kratafia ( tactical (fa* 111 *wr)i aa use,
,
sore c l struct it
.-•rvice depar ia« ' It waa, fwl L/,
rt* ji'ca and vigorously oppoaed by
Havy, eith both the rity of the




roar over '.he tfy«ifl
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n
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vMrim- . itl-sul .'lift cap
. r> ident-elect iy and the inc
lau&ra, w»re it tlw „
,
, In th« light
th ion packa&a **a ahtflved, to
b# ace .063-3 -ece&eal ev,, MM
I
1. 1 be below.
« ease ti«e, however, «».'« -.
.lately .
-ievei thinkir.
I I : vaa a .r'or-v •*-
retired 1 lor. ildent-elec
preeaed leral'j , t,
;o>? article, outlining urgent Aafeaet needs in the >el
war in retrospect to mxve beeoao
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iC changes that were to oosse were, on i;>
unforeseen tented I attentive
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. ; I . aylor, ' ocurit., .ait,
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,
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l iedy wo-;. -. iienhowor
military polic. *in'y atline »{ Likal* Mfft ,
limited iot ©v*m ajentionaa.
tlal tj
'he indioatj 3 to oo ,
r«oognlse< , Cen#« . eat
.?. ' f the
... in kha past, lack of a ooaaistaat, it
,
the absence oi ;,iona
ub lad i -te
: inter-aervice rivalries
have all Bade it .it to ow
:vu-:j t s ,tc
—> :"::;-.;u.a,:— .;f |«J tuioi raalljr ajrt*
I >r©for , ti itrttOtad tho MM
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en, ebruary—and i si. ltd wnatever
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The OtAO* two ateps iG"*edi I oleaented were a atep-u f,ho
.
-<jria r> :celorution of tfi- lie
effort. . ; 104 -iirecced M • two
•1 , r laria^ apotlaffet focused
on KM oliOili -o at this tisut, the airlxi t •
rmcy i ited *ar prone. , n ta by the
Administration were not regarded »a . at. J hi. *t
ire-. ac, va tn«L- ., at kite Row* direction, »*a now bending






•tat-r key elaasent of li an the iirjt
sonth was tiio formation of fenav, cxviiia - ltd 't I -jups"
the iMtafto for the study of defenae iesuea. una, headed
*nae OoafttO rlea J. itch, am&Md atrategic, M ral
war, oyate:i3, A BOOOOd, cnuired ..i . Nit00, is it
ecret. atenet tor intern , . i.ed
all aapect: . . mothers dealt eita reaofcTOA and
develop , end b see and ;tior.s. ' Jhe purpose of these
reviews w&a well ocr«t-ir ftaaara;
1 should oake it ci te
only our iir;*r. effort on a RttOa iax'^or problem. . . .
ve effort. ... ae lave sou
?or sore detaile.; I I n sea .ecretar
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and ware denounced by -ecret . ' In
tfefti , State ^epartne n even aaid
th irope should b<- by
^iseria^.n tr 1 w«»pona eere "prepaoterouij."
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Be'pen nable role of ground troo
lidup
fehi Aaeftafila . . WPlia criiit. ,
•*ahchev'8 anno talon >. wrioua
1 1 allita*? r - '/a
,
ared a new phaee.
ta »oratmin f'; cold *a* situ I tod
. r-uview of 43301'lcan and allied
st the aexi »eeke, fra^senti? of ,
,flll . to tns pr« . » in
the
amklii baaio aogaaatati .-, thoae
.liar aith the con ,nal
tmilAap
—
is largely what i veiled whan, aftor the
taalalon -. • 6 ievol , I












, June S . -1, '. ' :
• » jLHi-i.» » "iu-y i^» *vbl, pp. 1, 5; an iph
ilaopi iiag York iljr 3» 1961 , pi 12
«
§7




"jur effort reust be equally wide and (strong, and not obaeeeed by
any single tu .s-oturt*. »• Citi previ id
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support, likewise, was - ing. ^ittlo thought aeeaed to be
given to ftfcf Umlt *, etu »*1
•m
•nator had aober second sk (a about a aefena< t
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